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This study is an analysis of Issues concerning Federal
Government intervention mb a third-party to labor disputes,
and an examination of the particular problem of labor strife
at U. S. missile bases. The thesis set forth is that
tripartite action in labor relations is indispensable dam
to the potentially serious, detrimental effects that labor
disputes may have upon national security. This thesis is
based on the premise that the interests of the general public
take precedence over individual desires or choice of altar*
natives in labor-management relations.
Chapter 1 details the provenance of tripartite adjudi-
cation as related to national security, and clarifies the
overall problem au one of determining the need for Government
intervention in specific situations.
Chapter 11 provides an orientation to the United States
missile program in order to illustrate the setting in which
labor problems affecting national security may occur.
Chapter 111 focuses upon particular labor problems in
the missile-site construction program, and develops through a
discussion and analysis of the factual record, the acute
nature of missile-site labor disputes seriously threatening
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national security. Areas of conflict between Labor and
Management are clarified. The question Is posed as to bow
these threats to national security could best be removed.
Government action Is deemed appropriate.
Chapter IV explores the general Issue surrounding
Federal Government Intervention. This Involves an Inter-
relation of factors affecting both private and public Interests,
and the reaction of Labor, Management, and public authorities
to alternative policies whereby the Ideals of free enterprise
society might be preserved.
Chapter V analyzes the form of resolution chosen by
the Federal Government In order that missile-site labor disputes
not threaten further the health and safety of the nation.
Trlpartitlsm in the ameliorative techniques employed by the
Missile Sites Labor Commission is proven to be an effective
means of attending to labor troubles at missile bases. Conse-
quently, as a result of extensive tripartite action, threats
to national security are removed.
It is concluded that Federal Government Intervention as
a third-party to labor disputes should reflect, in instances
where threats to national security are imposed by irresponsible
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HISTORICAL REVIEW OP LABOR PROBLEMS
AFFECTING RATIONAL SECURITY
.
nils chapter discusses the history of defense industry
lebor problems in three phases: (1) World War I labor disputes
and adjustment agencies; (2) World War II labor disputes and
functions of the National War Labor Board; and (3) Labor
problems affecting national defense since 1945.
This historical review serves two purposes. First, the
discussion sets forth background information regarding the
effect that labor dispute problems have had upon defense
industrial production. These problems have occurred during
wartime periods and under cold-war peacetime conditions.
Labor problems affecting national defense industries are thus
not a recent phenomena. This country has wrestled with the
problem for some time. In the abstract, the setting is com*
plicated. It Involves analyses regarding social aspects,
politics, law, public opinion, and economics as well as factors
of necessity relating to national survival; also involved is
the perpetuation of American tradition as expressed in the
concepts of Freedom, Liberty, and Individual Worthiness. The
nation desires to preserve these concepts and further them in
the interests of an international community of free peoples.
In order that this goal may be attained it is imperative that
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the United Stat** be strong militarily. Military power can
be sustained only on a strong industrial and economic base.
The U. S. economy thrives on increased Industrial production
and additional potential for further increases. Improvements
in technology and in human relations provide support for a
growing , strengthened economy. Technological improvements
have provided Immeasurable benefits for our society. Hew
scientific discoveries and technological developments have
enabled the establishment of an immediate industrial potential
in the United States that is the strongest In the history of
the world. The record of coordination in human activity
achieved in the United States, making possible the activation
of industrial potential as expressed in the employment of men,
machines, materials, and money, is one of great achievement.
However, mB a practical matter aside from the abstract,
there are problems of operation, of organization, of direction,
of coordination, and of technique in the activity of employing
human resources to achieve economic and industrial means.
Specifically, this involves alleged conflicts of Interest
among three areas of society: Labor, Management, and the
Federal Government with its responsibility for action in the
public interest. The Federal Government is assumed to encompass
Labor and Management within its framework of protection built
up in the interests of society. Thus, a historical review of
.Mftd iaou< »m tan
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4labor problems in defense industries punctuates the problem of
aligning national public interests with those of Labor and
Management.
The second purpose of this historical review is to show
clearly that Federal Government intervention in labor disputes
is nothing new. Government intervention has occurred in this
modern age as early as the World War I period. In this respect,
it should be understood that different criteria for Government
action exist in time of war than during peacetime. In wartime,
successful prosecution of the war is the main standard for
action. In peacetime, some clarification is in order aa to
what constitutes critical Industrial activity vital to national
defense. Generally the Federal Government has intervened in
defense industry labor disputes only when it considered that
inaction would have caused more harm to the country's defense
posture than the actions of intervention.
Specific labor problems affecting defense industries
should be detailed in conjunction with the intervening efforts
of the Federal Government in promoting the national welfare.
It is intended that the ensuing discussion will convey an
appreciation for certain factual information regarding defense
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World War I Labor Disputes
and Adluitatnt Agencies
The World War 1 period was a significant one for the
labor movement in the United States end tor Federal Government
participation in Labor-Management relations. Certein charac-
teristics of this period ere important in understanding the
historical relationship between Labor, Management, end
Government. Indus trie1 unrest manifested in conflicts between
unions end employers had developed during the few years previous
to the War. In an authoritative account of the factors of
unrest, Bing1 details "the most important causes of strife"
as comprising "inadequate wages, long hours, and opposition to
collective bargaining and unionism." The Commission on
Industrial Relations was established by the Federal Government
to study labor relations in American Industry. On the whole,
the Commission's report wes favorable toward unionism. As a
result, the United States Department of Labor was established
"to study labor problems and represent the ceuse of wage*
earners."2 The Clayton Act was subsequently passed which seemed
Alexander M. Bing, Wartime Strikes and Their Settlement
(New York: E. P. Sutton Company, 1921), p. 2.
^Carroll R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American Industry
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to make caretin union activities legal, ^ axemptlng those
activities from prosecution under the anti- trust laws.^
Labor's causa wee advanced iurther in 1916 whan Congress
passad cue Adamson Act. This Act "provided for tha establish-
ment of a legal eight-hour day for workers engaged in operating
trains in interstate commerce and for tha appointment of a
presidential commission to study the results of the adoption
of the eight-hour day. "5
Organised labor at this tine was the strongest it had
ever been, it had won what was considered "official recognition
of its role in the national economy."6
A variety of problems was encountered when the united
States entered the World war. Stein and Davis 7 review the
characteristics of this period and detail tha nature of
industrial labor problems upon which attention was focused.
In part, and significant for this study, it is appropriate
to note certain of these characteristics:
3lbld .
^Foster Rhea Dulles, Labor in America (2d ad. rev.;
New York: Thomas Y. Crowe11 Company, 1960), p. 224.
Emanuel Stein and Jerome Davis (ed.), Labor Problems in
America (Hew York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940), p. 190.
6Dulles, loc. clt .
7Stein and Davia, op. clt .. pp. 188*209.
tav
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The lack of organization in labor supply » its
immobility, the necessity for adjustment Co tha
demand for both skilled and unskilled workers in
cartain industrial such as shipbuilding and
munitions, tha striking •actional and Industrial
variations in wages, tha groat Increase in labor
turnover, a decrease in labor efficiency, the
tendency on the part of employers to Ignore the
legal safeguards for labor, tha Increase in labor
unrest—these were only some of the many problems
that had to be solved. When the United States
entered tha War, it lacked both an adequate,
unified labor policy and a centralised, co-ordinated
administrative machinery for dealing with labor
problems.
^
This focuses attention on the fact that prior to World
War 1, the Federal Government had no effective agency mechanism
with which to aid tha organization, coordination, and direction
of labor-management relations. Tha war effort demanded that
immediate action be taken in order that productive capacity
could be expanded. This could be accomplished only if labor
disputes in industries affecting national defense were resolved.
Federal control over private industry was exercised when
President Wilson took over the operation of all railroads.
Congress had authorised this ostensibly "to overcome difficulties
growing out of conflicts of ownership and competitive aspirations
of various systems ;"' however, a threatened general strike on
8Stein and Davis, loc. cit .. p. 194.
9Marle fainsod, Lincoln Gordon, and Joseph C. Palamountain,
Jr., Government and the American Economy (3d ed.j Mew York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1959), p. 267.






















8the railroads was the underlying problem. This helped set tha
stage for Federal Government Intervention as a third-party
to labor disputas, which became an important, integral princlpla
ot dealing with labor problems affecting defense industries
during tha war*
Fifteen Major Government agencies functioned to adjust
labor disputas during World War 1. Ihraa important principle*
guided these adjustment agencies In their relations with
Management and Labor. M> Ihe avoidance of strikes and lockouts
was the firet and ioraaost consideration or these agencies.
Although strikes did actually occur, no substantial harm to
production or war materials resulted.
The second principle waa "recognition of the right of
workers to organise into unions and to be free from discrimi-
natory practices against union membership ."
Xhe third principle provided tor equal repreeeutation of
Management and Labor on the various labor ooarda. Ihe boards
functioned mainly through tha conduct of hearings and recommen-
dations resulting from such hearings.
It is important to note tha two agencies which headed
Government activity in labor relations. First, tha National
War Labor Board operated mB tha "supreme court" in adjusting
l0U. S. senate, Strikes In Defense industries . Senate
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wartin* labor controversies. Secondly, tha War Labor Pollclaa
Board served aa a "clearing houaa" for labor disputes. This
board was ooc directly involved In adjustment action; it
coordinated tha activities of tha other agencies
.
The nature of labor disputes during the war may be
clarified by examining the separata attitudes of employers
and employees. Blng contrasts tha attitudes of employer
associations with tha position taken generally by individual
employers in dealing with their own employees. Whan acting
collectively, employers through their associations took rather
liberal views regarding Labor* Management voiced good
intentions to cooperate with employees and with the Government
regarding labor policy. But tha attitude actually taken by
employers in administering labor relations programs was not
liberal* Management unwillingness to deal with unions on a
practical basis seriously hampered the administration of labor-
management relations. As an example, Blng supplies tha following
accounts of employer non-cooperation:
Even with tha war at ita height the Lake
Carriers 9 Association would not attend a meeting
of the Shipping Board, at which employers from
all over the country were present, because repre-
sentatives of the Seamen's Union attended. Iha
llBing, op. clt .. p. 225.
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rtaion for this refusal was the data that to sit
la the sana room with union representatives would
constitute recognition. In New York the boat
owners would not accept the Government's plan of
local adjustment agencies because this Involved
s board on which a representative of the Long*
shoremen's Union would be a member; a special
board had to be created with no representation of
either employer or employee
.
the western Union Telegraph Company preferred
to have the Government take over the wires rather
than tolerate union membership among its employees
,
and this same position was taken by the Smith and
Wesson Company •••**•
The foregoing situations highlight the fact that employer
cooperation was lacking in several instances and that Government
intervention became necessary in order to promote the war effort.
The outstanding World War I case in which employer
obstinance resulted in forceful action by the Federal Govern*
13
went was that of the Smith and Wesson Company controversy.
This occurred at Springfield, Massachusetts during the summer
of 1918. The issue revolved around the principle of collective
bargaining. The facts were that the Springfield plant was
manufacturing pistols for the War Department ; the company had
been operating for years with a closed non-union shops the
employees demanded that they be permitted to organize with the
Machinists Union; the company refused to bargain and discharged
various employees whom the company thought were active unionists.
I2lbid . « p. 226.
*%. S. Senate, op. cit .. p. 172
tSSl'i. frvii flj
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Company refusal Co bargain collectively resulted In a strike
by about half the work force at the Springfield plant. The
dispute was referred to the National War Labor Board which
held in favor of the employees and ordered the company to
accept the Board's decision, and as a result, the Federal Gov-
ernment "took over the company's plant under the commandeering
15
power of the National Defense Act (Sec. 120) .
Organised Labor, too, had to concede to the authority of
the Federal Government. The outstanding case involved a series
of strikes at Bridgeport, Connecticut, an important munitions
manufacturing center during World War 1. Bing states that
the industrial strife at Bridgeport stemmed from "bad pre-war
industrial relations." 16 The main issue in the Bridgeport
disputes concerned wages. ' Bridgeport machinists went out on
strike in defiance of a decision rendered by the National War
Labor Board. The strike ended when President Wilson "wrote
the machinists threatening to draft them if they did not go
back to work. This ended the strike." 18
15U. S. Senate, loc. cit .
*wBing, pp. cit .. p. 73.
17 Ibid ., pp. 73-81.























How did Management and Labor fool regarding Government
labor administration? Among employers, opinion was divided.
Employer feelings varied according to previous relations with
employees, attitudes toward organized labor in general , and
upon employer opinion as to whether a strike could be defeated.
In general. Management evidenced a distrust toward Government
labor administration, feeling that Labor was being favored by
the Government for political reasons.
Labor's attitudes toward Government intervention gener-
ally were cordial and favored Government action; although in
some instances, as illustrated by the Bridgeport disputes,
Ubor b.U.v.,1 that »*. Cov.r~.nt w.. c.fri., to big bu.tn....»2
Two conclusions may be drawn from the actions of Govern*
ment Intervention and the attitudes of Management and Labor
as have been detailed. First, Government action in the Smith
and Wesson and Bridgeport cases served to make clear to Manage-
ment and Labor alike that the Federal Government's power would
definitely be wielded in order that effective conduct of the
War could be pursued. Secondly, no clear understanding nor
definition of proper relationships among Management, Labor,
and Government was ever resolved to the satisfaction of Manage-
ment and Labor.
19Bina. op. cit . . pp. 231-232.
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World War XI Labor Disputeg and Function*
of the EatIon*1 War Labor Board
Tha record of Labor*Management relatione during World
War II was one of co-operative effort on the pert of employers,
employees, end the Federel Government directed towerd one com-
mon, ell-Important, end specific goal: that of providing suf-
ficient industrial production to win the wer. To this end
there was unparalleled cooperation and national spirit in the
all-out industrial effort. The lebor dispute experiences and
agency mechanisms of World War X had demons treted that Govern-
ment participation in labor dispute adjustments could be profit-
able for national Interests. The foundation for wartime coop-
eration had been laid. Thus the overell labor experience dur-
ing World War XI was favorable for both Management and Labor
as far as cooperative actions of the perties during wartime
wes concerned.
It is significant that World War II resulted in extremely
repld gains for Organized Lebor. At the beginning of the war,
Labor was concerned over union security, employee representa-
tion on government agencies, and the cost-of-living ab mani-
fested in the relationship between wages end prices. 21 The
21See John H. Mariano, Wartime Lebor Relations (Mew York:
National Public and Labor Relations Service Bureau, 1944),
Chapters I, II, and III. Also: Foster Rhea Dulles, op. clt ..
p. 232.
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concern of Labor regarding worker representation on Government
Labor adjustment board* was short* lived. The National War
Labor Board was established on January 12, 1942 by Executive
Order No. 9017 issued by President Roosevelt. 22 This board
was composed of four members fron Industry, four from Labor,
and four representing the Public. 23
Labor's concern over union security was ameliorated
throughout the war. Early satisfaction was gained by Labor
as a result of National War Labor Board functions. In the
words of Poster Rhea Dulles:
The War Labor Board got off to a good start in
1942 when it found a solution to the issue of
union security in the so-called maintenance of
membership agreements. Neither a closed nor a
union chop were to be enforced. Union members
or those who joined a union, however, were re-
quired as part of any contract made in their
behalf to remain union members for the life of
the contract, and they were subject to discharge
from their employment if at any time they failed
to maintain good union standing. Management
representatives on the War Labor Board protested
this arrangement and were never to be wholly
reconciled to it, but they at least passively
acquiesced after provision had been made for an
initial fifteen day escape period during which
any employee could withdraw from a union wholly
without prejudice. Once arrived at, the prin-
cipal of maintenance of membership was to be
22D. 3. National War Labor Board, The Termination Report
of the Rational War Labor Board . Vol. 1, p. 6.
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consistently uphnld throughout the war ....
Nothing could have contributed mora substan-
tially to Industrial peace than such assuranca
that union sacurity and individual freedom of
action would ba alika safeguarded ••••**
The issue of wages and prices became a more difficult
problem. The problem waa characterised by government concern
over inflationary trends, a need to maintain economic stabil-
ity while at war, and the dissatisfaction of Labor with wage
levels compared with the cost of living. 25 ihe National War
Labor Board, however, formulated a wage stabilisation policy
which was considered by one Chairman as the Board's most out-
standing achievement. This opinion was expressed by Or. George
W. Taylor who stated:
1 will always consider that the formulation
of the national wage stabilisation policy was the
Board's greatest achievement not only because of
the difficulty of the problem but because the
welfare of the nation was so dependent upon this
action.26
On the Management side, it was significant that organised
Management declared publicly its approval of conciliation in
labor disputes affecting defense industries. 27 This position
24Dulles, op. cit .. pp. 335-336.
26U. S. national War Labor Board, op.cit .. p. XIX.
27Twentieth Century Fund, Labor and national Defense
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1941), p. 123.
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It explained in part by Management's realization of the
stature of Labor In the national economy. In World War I
some employers had refused to recognise the principle of
collective bargaining. By World War II, employers could no
longer ignore union status and employee rights to organise .
Management thus had no choice but to underwrite the process
of adjustment in labor disputes m» developed by the Federal
Government.
The functions of the national War Labor Board revolved
around the principle of "voluntarism," or cooperation among
the civilian labor population, employers, and the Government—
and around the principle of "tripartitism." Voluntarism
reflected the Intentions of all parties to substitute peaceful
adjudication for strikes and was evidenced by the no-strike,
no*lockout agreement of Labor and Management*
Xripartitism was primarily an assurance that all labor
disputes would be resolved. Thus, there was no opportunity
for some disputes to become non-arbitreble* The situation re-
flected the fundamental basis for Government intervention mb
providing a means whereby Industrial production would continue
at all times .28
28U. S* Rational War Labor Board, op. clt.
, pp. XV-XIX .
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Recognition should be afforded the "peculiar circum-
stances" under which the National War Labor Board operated.
Braun describes these circumstances in the following manner:
Its activities and policies rested upon the
doctrine of the existence of a moral, if not a
legal, obligation not to strike or lockout in
wartime. No regular agency will, under ordinary
circumstances, have the opportunity of functioning
on such a basis. Moreover, the Board was a temporary
short-term institution 'created because of the war
and with no thought that it will last after the last
shot is fired.* As part of the nation's war product-
ion machinery, it could count on more willingness of
management and labor to cooperate than a peacetime
agency functioning in an atmosphere in which the
common purpose of winning a war does not exist. On
the other hand, a temporary emergency board of
such type cannot be expected to give too much
thought to the pursuit or development of long-term
policies designed to satisfy the needs of peacetime
dispute settlement also. It neither has the time
nor the function to do so. Its primary task in the
field of dispute settlement is the preventing of
interruptions of war production and, to attain this
objective, it is perfectly Justified to use all
available means, including unorthodox ones which
might not work under different conditions. Exped-
iency might be given e greater role than might be
advisable in the case of permanent agencies •**
Braun' s analysis highlights a point made previously in
the Introduction to this chapter; different criteria for
Government action exist in time of war than during peacetime.
The actions of such a Board during wartime are accepted by
Management, Labor, and the general public m9 a practical basis
2*Kurt Braun, Labor Disputes and Their Settlement
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955), p. 250.
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for ensuring that wartime industrial production is not slowed,
hampered, or otherwise affected by labor disputes. The gen*
eral public realises that the Federal Government must have
operational administrative machinery during wartime to prevent
harm to the industrial economy. In essence, the Government's
"role in labor controversies is determined by the people who
make up the government ."$0 Government intervention as a
third-party to labor disputes thus becomes the generally ac-
cepted method of dealing with industrial human relations prob-
lems as conveyed by disputes between employers and employees.
Labor Problems and national Defense
SJLncc m$
Previous discussion has detailed the significance that
Government participation in Labor-Management relations held
for the public interest during World War 11. Two major pro-
ducts evolved from those wartime experiences. One was "the
fundamental issue of voluntarism .... as a basis for public
policy in labor disputes. "51 in this respect, the war brought
forth unprecedented cooperation between Management and Labor.
This was examplad by the full acceptance of collective
30Milton L. Blum, Industrial Psychology and Its Social
Foundations (Hew York; Harper and Brothers, 1956) pp. 238-239.
31Orme W. Phelps, Introduction to Labor Economics
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bargaining as an underlying principle oi labor ralatlona pro*
grama in American industries.
A further produce of the war wee trlpartitlsm; the working
relationship of the Federal Govarnmant in combination with
mensgoment and Labor—all soaking together Co sustain stability
in labor ralatlona so that defense Industrial production could
proceed unharmed by labor disputes between employers and em-
ployees •
But what about the applicability of these concepts within
the context of a postwar economy?
It la now intended to trace these concepta of voluntarism
and trlpartitiem through the poso#er years following world
War II, moid up to the year 1934 whan the United States began
a significant program of belliatlc missile development.
First of all, the idea of voluntarism has permeated prac-
tically all concepts of industrial human relatione programs
since rforld War II. The development of personnel counseling
programs, the recognition of industrial social psychology m*
a moans of achieving higher industrial production goals and
increased business profits, and the applicability of personnel
programs encompassing employee dynamics and research programs
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leaders&ip la labor relations aids in achieving business
|MU*tt
That the eplrit of voluntarism woo preserved end utilised
throughout the con years following World Wor II is evidenced
la tho following statement of Professor Arthur Whltehlll,Jr.:
•• ^f ^^^oa ^^B^^m» ^m aia*mej^^^ a* w^eem™ sa a*oa** ^ee^M* ^a^^ imbw Mt ywi %» 4a^^ eew^^a^ s
techniques, and devices la personnel administration
aod labor relations ara tbo poiat of view and op*
proaeh utilised la chair administration. Hero and
aora business leaders aro recognising that la huaaa
relations lioa tho raal koy to progress in tho year*
What la aaaat by "poiat of view and approach" aa
talaed in the above quotation? The question aay be answered
by considering voluntarism aa inherent in any Industrial hu-
aaa relations program. Voluntarism means cooperation. Coop-
eration la achieved through the efforts of employers and em-
ployees and reflects basic policies of voluntary cooperation.
Cooperation between workers and employers has been sustained
to e high degree) the two have achieved laudable progress in
returning "to the traditional American attitude that all men
are equal ."** Ibis idea of equality in labor relations is
32aa epprecietion of this reaeoning is contained la
Roger Bellows, feyefroJlogy oj personaa^ fa Business aaj fn^ustrjc
(3d ed.i Englevood Cliffs, si.J. s Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961),
passim.
^Arthur M. Whitehall, Jr., Personnel Relations (lew York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1955), p. 507.
William R. Sprlegel, ^Just^s
J. Mai^foneM (5th ed.;
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expressed In the recognition by Management that Labor occupies
an unalterable position In the industrial economy— this con-
cept finds expression in collective bargaining principles;
when Labor Is afforded recognition of its right to organise
and represent employees, then Management is in essence saying
"we recognise you and we will voluntarily cooperate with you
in the interests of our business, our employees, and the
public."
It may seen that this discussion of voluntarism has so
far concentrated on Management* s application of the concept.
Although this has served m the medium through which voluntar-
ism has been traced, it should be recognised that both Labor
and the Federal Government have been involved in the labor
relations activities of American industry. Voluntarism has
been defined as cooperation among the civilian labor force,
employers, and the Government. Cooperation has been achieved
In the activities ox all three, and a voluntary approach has
identified the cooperative attitudes of all three.
Tripartitism has likewise been upheld and utilised in
the administration of labor relations activities. The Federal
Conciliation System is an example of tripartite action. The
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, established by
the Taft-Hartley Act, reflects the enduring application of
tripartitism in labor dispute adjustments. There are other
-f >04| *,
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governmental Boards of chi» vein. It It considered unnecessary
Co tract the utilisation of tha various Boards; tha important
fact to note is that tripartltlsn has Daaa actual through thasa
recent times.
Trlpartltism, however, has not andurad without criticism.
Its usefulness has baan questioned repeatedly. 35 Ihasa criti-
cisms hava included charges of partisanship among Board member-
ships; tha belief that trlpartltism Is not an appropriate da*
vice for developing long-term, continuous, responsible public
policies; that Impermanence of membership on tripartita boards
does not land wall to perpetuation of basic policies*
It is considered that tha above criticisms are secondary
to the necessity for providing a means of resolution in all
disputes. Without third-party participation by Government,
Management and Labor could revert to positions of obstlnance
whereby non-agreements would result in strikes affecting adverse*
ly those U. S. defense industries directly and indirectly
related within the industrial economy. Therefore, trlpartltism
is defended on the basis that it provides a proven method
of resolving labor disputes to the benefit of society.
Beside tha fact that the durability and utilisation of
voluntarism and trlpartltism hava been useful tools in
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administering labor relations Activities since World War II,
the postwar period was significant in another aanner for labor
proolams concerning national defense industries. Following
World War II the world was confronted with a Ownum* t challenge
directed toward world domination. The United States became
the economic leader of the Free World's battle against Commun-
ism. The advent of the Cold War made increased Industrial
production necessary to sustain a Free World defense posture
strong enough to combat the Communist menace. The requirements
of national defense and foreign aid resulted in inflationary
trends in the U. S. economy. This was evidenced by rising
levels of prices and wages. Industrial production advanced
by virtue of scientific, technological, and human relations
progress by American businesses. Organised Labor, too, advanced
in material degree to a position whereby it challenged Manage*
ment to share business profits as never before.
Coupled with these facts, the United States Government
became faced with some plaguing questions. When would inter*
ventlon into labor disputes serve the best interests of society?
When is intervention necessary in order to protect national
interest? What industries affect national defense? Will dem-
ocratic principles be best served through Government domination
of labor dispute adjudicative machinery or should Management
MM H '; •*' . •' • ..
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and Labor be permittad couplata freedom of action in the labor
relatione processes?
During the ten year period 1945*54, labor problems in
defense industries posed no real threat to the national indus-
trial economy as concerning military needs and requirements.
It is true that there were periods of national emergency as
during the Berlin Airlift and during the Korean Conflict.
But through these periods there existed no general reaction
of the American public, of national leaders on the public
scene, of Management, or of Labor, to the effect that national
security was seriously threatened In a grave and material sense,
General belief was predicated on the premise that the United
States was so far ahead of the rest of the world in scientific,
technological, and Industrial potential that the defeat of the
Communist countries could be accomplished at will, anytime,
and without undue hardship or sacrifice on the part of the
American population. Within this general framework of public
opinion, Labor enjoyed a protected position. Who could prove
that Labor's demands were contrary to national Interests? Mo
one could. Ho demonstrable necessity could be clarified that
would cause a public concern for Labor's Increasing demands
to share in business profits.
National defense wes thus considered as unaffected by
labor problems during this peacetime period. Although the
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country was never officially at war with tha Communists, tha
recognition of a Cold War state in intarnational ralatioaa re-
sulted in a measure of concarn over where to draw tha line
between industries affecting national dafanaa and thoaa not
affacting tha nation' • military posture. Tha question was
never resolved. Attempts were oade in definitive srguments
over national emergency strikes by Government, Mensflomont, end
Labor. However, an integral part of the issue waa always the
appropriateness of Federal Government intervention at a
given tine.
This chapter has outlined the history of labor problems
in defense industries in the light of wartime and peacetime
experiences. One particular problem has been transfixed as
overshadowing all others, this problem is one of determining
the need and degree of Federal Government intervention as a
third-party to labor disputes.
Two conclusions are drawn from this historical review.
The first is that wartime demand immediate , unqualified action
by Government in getting a tripartite system of labor dispute
adjudication underway. This requirement results from the
state of national emergency aa conveyed by the need for an
uninterrupted flow of industrial production. Such production
'i»tf* ,
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1* required In order to meet military and economic needs of
the country. Military naada ara stressed bacauaa of materials
required by the military tarvleaa in waging war. Economic
naada ara conaldarad m» matarial requirements sustaining the
general population in ita support of the "war machine.
"
A second conclusion is that peacetime brings no end to
the problem of determining the necessity for Government inter*
vention as a third-party to labor disputes. Just as definitions
are required tta to what constitutes industries affecting na-
tional dafenae in peacetime, so alao must there be definition
as to what constitutes peace. In the content of the Free
World* a battle against international Communism in general
,
and specifically in reference to the economic and industrial
advances made by the Soviet Union since World War II, 'peace"
simply does not exist, nor has it been present since World
War II ended. In this sense, the different criteria for de-
termining governmental participation in the labor relations
of employers and employees in times of war and peace may be
leas definite than was originally considered, the question
is not amenable to specific analysis* The problem is compli-
cated by other factors than the desires of Labor and of
Management. The general public, too, has a stake in the matter.
rJt bsn
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Overall analysis should consider the public interest as
Che aost important, significant, and foremost basis for
decision. Before the nation can perpetuate public interests,
freedom from destruction must be secured. The society must
be preserved first, and the details of individual interests
can be worked out later. Because of this overwhelming need
for preservation, dominance in military power is required. In
these modern times this conclusion is inescapable.
In the following chapters, a definite problem whereby
individual interests conflict with those of American society
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CHAPTER II
THE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROGRAM
TtAID
Introduction
The previous chaptar introduced the problea of Government
intervention in labor natters and Illustrated through histori-
cal experience the necessity for tripartita action in American
labor relations* However, some definite node of production
oust utilise human labor resources in order that labor dispute
problems nay require adjudication. In this respect , applica-
tion of the previous chapter's analysis is to be made to the
United States missile program.
This chapter will detail the advent of ballistic missiles
and a United States missile program, the administrative pat-
tern of missile program management, an appreciation for the
magnitude of the operation, and the dependency of the missile
program on construction support* This information will provide
en orientation to the setting in which labor problems occur.
ffro Advat oj mU* frto *ttffU«f §nd
§ Uni^o; States *fl§f\l* *yoftFf»
A nontechnical introduction to missiles is provided in
an interesting book1 written by a United States Air Force
officer, Colonel MeIs A. Parson, Jr., who is regarded m an
^ls A. Parson, Jr., Missiles and the Revolution in
Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962).
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authority on missile tactics and strategy. Colonel Parsons
was a participant in Operation Paperclip, the program that
brought Dr. Wernher von Braun and his colleagues to the U. S.
iron Germany after World War II. Colonel Parsons sketches
briefly the record of missile development since man first
attempted rocket experiments.
An ancient Chinese scholar and scientist named Van Hu
was perhaps the first person to try to propel himself into
space. Chinese historians relate that Wan Hu fastened a clus-
ter of crude rockets to a sedan chair and fired them all
simultaneously. It still isn't known how successful Wan Hu
was, for upon the rockets' blast, he disappeared and "has not
b..n tend fro. .Inc. "*
Other accounts of rocket development show that during
the 15th Century wars, use of rockets was made by the French
against British forces. Germans experimented with war rockets
up to one hundred pounds weight in the 17th Century. In 1806,
th. Britt.h bort,ard.d Boulogo. with rockots find fro. bet..
3
However, little significant development of missiles and
rockets occurred until the 20th Century. Advances in
2Ibid .. p. 17.
^Phillip De La Ferte, Rocket (New York: Philosophical
Library, 1957), pp. 14-15. Cited by Colonel Edgar R. Jackson,
Jr., U. S. Air Force, An Analysis of the Air Force Ballistic
Missile Base Construction Problem : Unpublished thesis,
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scientific and technological knowledge elded the development
of the airplane and aroused new interest in eir and space
travel. Significant advances in the development of missiles
and rockets were achieved by Goddard^ in 1919, Oberth^ in
1923, and Saenger in 1933. These were accomplished respective*
ly in the United States, Germany, and Austria.
during the period 1933-1939, the Germans developed a
superior advantage in the development of guided missiles
through an organized program of research end development.'
Although the rockets developed were crude compared to present
day missile sophistication, the significant fact was that
ballistic missiles became feasible as weapons of war. The
subsequent development of the German V-2 rocket is well known.
It was widely recognised that such a weapon, combined with
the nuclear warheeds developed and displayed by the United
States, held vast potential for destruction. The Soviet Union,
the United States, end other Allies competed in locating Ger-
man rocket scientists and obtaining their services.
Parson, pp. cit .. p. 19.
5Ibid., p. 20.
6 IbU.
7Ibid ., p. 22.
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After World War II, the United States stepped up e pro*
gram of missile development which had begun during the war but
had received no urgent treatment.** From 1943 through 1930,
missile development activities were concentrated mainly at
White Sands, New Mexico. The Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville,
Alabama was established in 1949. But during this period, the
U. S. made the decision to rely upon aircraft to deliver nuclear
weapons, and Jet aircraft development took precedence over
guided missiles. This decision gave the U. S. a superior
strategic advantage that was destined to be seriously threatened
by Soviet Russia a few years later.
The need for a program of ballistic missile development
in the United States closely paralleled the state of the Cold
War. Before Korean hostilities, there appeared little reason,
at least as far as public opinion was concerned, to question
the proposition that the Free World would champion the democratic
spirit and American ideals. However, the Communists were at
work to undermine the security of Free Peoples. An organised
research program was evidently given priority in Soviet Russia
to develop guided missiles. The Soviet intent must have been
to achieve superior strategic advantage over the United States
capability of delivering nuclear weapons by means of manned
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aircraft. The Korean Conflict pointed up the seriousness of
Communism's intent to spread world-wide.
A change of attitude began to affect the American public.
Concern over Russian technological advances led to Increases
in the united States Missile budget.
Proa 1945 to 1950 the missile program In this
country averaged about $70 million a year, gradually
creeping up to $135 million by 1950. The first
year of Korea *&* $800 million spent on missiles,
and the second more than $1 billion.'
Congressional records reveal that in 1953, control was
centralised over missile programs of the U. S. armed services
by the Secretary of Defense, this action, taken in the first
year of a new Administration, served to channel missile activi-
ties into the regular planning structure of the Department of
Defense. Such action resulted in the authorization on Novem-
ber 12, 1953 for the Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and
Navy to fund and implement their respective guided-mlssile
development programs. This was to be accomplished 'Srichin the
framework of and consistent with established policies and
procedures for interservice coordination, apportionment and
control of funds and production scheduling."^
9Ibid . . p. 38.
10U. S. House of Representatives, Organisation and Manage-
ment of Missile Programs . Eleventh Report by the Committee on
Government Operations, House Report No. 1121, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess., September 2, 1959, p. 10. Cited hereafter as U. S.


























This reorganization may thus be considered m» the real
beginning of a coordinated program of ballistic missile devel-
opment in the United States.
Administrative Pattern
Missiles are developed by the Air Force, Army, and Navy
for tactical requirements, for air defense, and for strategic
deterrence purposes.
Those missiles of most importance to this study are of
two types. One is tne long-range inter-continental ballistic
missile (ICBW), designed to carry nuclear warheads over a
5,000 or 6,000 mile distance. The second is the intermediate-
range ballistic missile (I&BH), designed for launching from
forward land areas or from the B€M8 to a distance of 1,50C
to 2,000 miles. These are strategic missiles; they have
received high national priority, are expensive to build, com-
plicated, and evoke special organisations and procedures in
development and production.*1
The 1CBM is assigned exclusively to the Air Force for
development, production, and deployment. * Three types of
ICBM's have been most significant: Atlas, Titan, and ilinuteman.
UIbid . . p. 21.
12Ibid .
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The XRBM has included three a*in types: Polaris, Thor,
and Jupiter. The Navy hat been assigned the Polaris for use
at b%m. The Air Force has developed and produced the Thor,
and the Array the Jupiter. However, the Army has not been
permitted to field the Jupiter. Deployment and use of the
Thor and Jupiter has been limited to the Air Force.^
Overall missile management has thus been a three-sided
military effort, with special management organisations utilised
by each military service. Air Force missile management has
been effected under the control of the Air Research and
Development Command. The Army's work on the Jupiter missile
has been the responsibility of the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency, Army Ordnance Missile Command at Huntsvllle, Alabama.
The Navy Polaris management has been effected by a Special
Projects Office of the Navy.
The urgent need for a streamlined, effective missile
program was recognised early following concentration of missile
development effort in the office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD). In 1953, six additional Assistant Secretaries were
created to aid the Secretary for Research and Development and
for Applications Engineering. Although these two posts were
UIbld .
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not specifically advertised aa such, the naln Intention was
that they should monitor missile development. In January 1954,
the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development establish-
ed the Research and Development Coordinating Committee on
Guided Missiles. This committee's function was "for achieving
a sound coordinated and Integrated research and development
program in the field of guided missiles/' 14
This administration pattern was continued the following
ytar, when in 1955, the Gillette Committee reviewed than*
existent administrative procedures and submitted recommenda-
tions for improvement.^ The Committee's report "laid the
foundation for the Department of Defense administrative pattern
in handling not only the ICBM and IRBM programs but new weapons
such m$ the Hike-Zeuk anti-missile missile, which also have
been accorded high priority/'16
A primary concern of the Gillette Committee was the prob-
lem of industrial and military construction. On November 8,
1955, the Secretary of Defense made the following specific
l4Dcpartment of Defense Directive 5128.15, dated January 6,
1954. U. S. House of Representatives, Organisation and Manage-
of Missile Programs . Hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations. 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
February 4-Msrch 20, 1959, p. 730.
I5B>id . . p. 639.
l0U. S.House of Representatives, House Report
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authorisations and general operating concepts regarding missile
program coostruetion:
lbs Secretary of the Air Force . . . and the
joint Aray-Havy Committee • • • were delegated
authority to approve facilities requirements, as*
tablish completion dates, designate the agency for
construction best able to meet the required objec-
tives, and to approve the construction. Funds
apportioned by the Bureau of the Budget ware to be
made available in lump cues as justified la the
development plans and reflected in the financial
plans mB approved by the OSD Ballistic Missiles
Committee. In the meantime the Secretary of the
Air Force and the joint Army-navy Committee ware
authorised to proceed immediately with their studies
and with the design of facilities required to support
their purposes. 2''
In chronological sequence then, the year 1955 marked
another administrative change in the U. $• missile program
that had been given priority during Korean hostilities and
which had bean significantly reorganised in 1953. the 1955
management organisation was utilised until 1957. la October
1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1 into orbit. Immediate
concern waa demonstrated by the American public over the Bus*
slan accomplishment. U. S. missile programs ware stapped up
accordingly, and the military potential of space seemed
unlimited.
The Defense Reorganisation Act of 195S provided another
means of speeding-up missile program decision-making processes
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and minimising research and development duplication, this
Act established the new post of Director of Defense Research
and Engineering. This office was to take precedence over all
other Department of Defense Assistant Secretaries* The duties
of the new Director were "to act as principal adviser to the
Secretary of Defense on scientific and technical matters; to
supervise all research and engineering activities in the
Department of Defense; to direct and control (including their
assignment or reassignment) research and engineering activities
that the Secretary deems to require centralised management
.
Chart Ho, 1 depicts the changes in the Department of
Defense Guided Missile Management Program through the 1950*8*
Any conclusion forthcoming from analysis of these modifications
must reflect the basic fact that at all times the organisational
structure has been complicated and the overall program of
great magnitude*
The goals of the United States missile program must
necessarily be couched in general terms, it is understandable
that specific information must be classified in the Interests
of national security. One die whole, it should be understood
that the main goal is the development of a weapons capability
l
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enabling the U. 8. to hold military superiority over the
Soviet Union. In practical tarns this is the nain objective.
Aa a natter of fact this is the primary concern* This is
a standing goal that must be achieved through long-range plans
of weapons development. Missiles are complicated. Their
effectiveness and dependability depend upon scientific , tech-
nological, and human relations achievements. Scientific
progress finds expression through basic and applied research.
Technological development depends on the ability of man to
utilise all known resources, including human labor, in aehicv*
lag new means of accomplishing desired results. This reason-
ing may be appropriately applied to the U.S. missile program
in the sense chat effective administration depends on the
ability of men to organise, deputise, and supervise within
the context of labor relations programs.
The scope of such a labor program is enormous. The
missile program is a complex operation. Missiles must be
designed, manufactured, tested, transported to launching areas,
housed, and serviced in order to be operational.
Assuming that a missile has gone through the manufactur-
ing stage and is ready for use, what is the next big problem?
The problem may be considered as one of getting the missile
to a launching site and launching It. This brings construction
ft*
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labor efforts into focus, for before e missile can be stored
aud launched, site facilities oust be available.
foe Dependency pi the H^ssl^e Proftraja
How seriously do construction labor problems affect the
capability of the United States to attain effective alssile
capability? This question is significant in the sense that
laslie-site construction is a vital link in the chain of
events leading to the operational utilisation of ballistic
•isslies.
However, before labor problems are discussed, it nay be
appropriate to establish in clearer detail the dependency of
ballistic missiles on construction support.
the airplane is dependent on an air base for housing,
servicing, and runway facilities and is of no value unless
these are provided. Similarly, the missile must have physical
facilities to be of value. However, in the case of the
airplane, an air base can be utilised for various types of
aircraft. Allowable tolerances in the type, site, and shape
of airfields are fairly liberal. For example, an air base
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adapted with relative ease for use by a aoderu heavy jet bomber
such as the B-52. 19
Ttiia concept of base and weapons-site adaptation has been
changed though aa applicable to balliatic missile*. Each
missile varlea aa to tha configuration oil ita launching aita.
Xbaaa missiles ara antiraly news thay require new construction
of aita facilitiea. Missile-sites mr% complex and chey ara
expensive; and aiaailaa cannot be made operational without con-
atrue tion support.
Summary
Missiles and rockets have been experimented with for
centuries but it was only during the current century that
man developed these mb affective weapons of war. Missile de-
velopment paralleled the state of other technical and scientific
discovery. The United States began a limited amount of work
on missiles during World War II, but German efforts were the
main achievements. After World War II, the U. S. missile
program was not significant until the Soviet Union began to
demonstrate proficiency in this area. Aa the Cold War progressed,
19
Major General Augustus M. Minton, "Basing the Aerospace
Force," Air University Quarterly Review . Vol. 12, Winter and
Spring, 1960*61, p. 176. The dependency of the ballistic
missile on construction support is clarified in graphic detail
through photographs of missile launching aites and a comparison
of Aircraft and Missile support requirements in Colonel Edgar
R. Jackson, Jr., loc. cit .
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che U. It stepped up its missile eiforts and got a coordinated
program underway la tha early 1950' a. la 1957, the iiret
Russian Sputnik highlighted the need far a great U« S. effort
to design «*d develop missile systems*
Miaailaa ara of llttla valua without physical alta iaci li-
tis*. Therefore, construction support is mannatory. Missile*
sltas oust ba cons true tad through human afforts. It seems
logical that labor dispute problem could ba one manner by
which delays, higher costs, and damage to the U. S* defense
posture could be effected*
£*
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CHAPTER III
A PROBLEM OF NATIONAL COHCERMt LABOR
DISPUTES AT U.S. MISSILE BASES
mum uzaca
Introduction
Preceding chapters have reviewed in some detail the
record of labor problems affecting national defense , intro-
duced the issue of Government intervention as a third-party
to labor disputes, traced the development of the United States
missile program, established the dependency of the program
upon construction support, and pinpointed labor dispute
problems as having potentially serious effect upon missile
program goals and effectiveness.
This chapter will focus upon labor disputes in the
missile program as occurred during the time period 1937 to
1961. More specifically, this period covers the time lapse
between the launching of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union in
October 1957, and April 1961 when a United States Senate
investigating committee began a series of hearings probing
labor problems at missile-sites. The investigating group
was the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the
Committee of Government Operations, the chairman of which was,
and has continued to be. Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas
Ihe published record of these hearings 1 details a pattern
of work stoppages, slow-downs, high wage-rates
,
hi. S. Senate, Work Stoppage at Missile Bases . Hearings
before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the
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inter-union conflicts, and high expenses of construction that
have remained unjustified by union* management, military, and
public officials. Whore ths responsibility lies for these
abuses has been a controversial subject ever since the Mc-
Clellan Committee hearings spotlighted the crucial problem
end the effects that labor problems were having on missile-site
construction. Rational concern as reflected in public opinion
and Immediate communications media attention became a primary
demand source for action to curb the detrimental time and
money losses occurring in missile program construction* As
soon as responsible governmental leadership realised the im-
pact of these labor disputes, an immediate analysis resulted
In executive action which turned the tide of abuse from in-
creasing to decreasing proportions. Such action was che es-
tablishment of a Missile Sites Labor Commission by the Presi-
dent of the United States. An analysis of this Commission's
activities is made in a subsequent chapter. The study, analy-
sis, and research preceding the resultant progress was reflective
of effort by all involved areas of Labor, Management, and Gov-
ernment to seek some method of resolution quickly and efficiently*
Committee on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sees.;
Part 1, April 25, 26, 27, 2S and Part 2, May 2,3,4,5 and
June 9, 1961.
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The parties Co these proceedings comprised labor unions,
contracting construction companies, military administrators,
and other governmental agencies involved in the missile- site
construction labor activity.
As these disputes are revealed, it is appropriate to
bear in mind the general atmosphere enveloping the situation.
The missile program is one method by which the united States
upholds the security of the Free World. One purpose of sus-
taining a democratic society is to allow Individual freedom
of choice or selection of alternatives regarding dispensation
of labor services and utilization of such by societal parti-
cipants. The alignment of public Interest commensurate
with individual bargaining rights is reflective of dynamic
processes of social or community adjustment to scientific,
technological, and human relations progress. At all stages
of the society's expansion or perpetuation, problems crop up
regarding the organisation, coordination, and technique of
employing human labor resources. Labor disputes at U. S.
missile-sites are illustrative of the form taken by m^y f
these problems.
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Following Sputnik I la October 1957 , there vu rapid
action on the American scene in getting * more significant
missile-site construction program underway at full speed*
In onrly 1958, the Congress passed a supplemental construction
authorisation and appropriation bill, providing 112 million
dollars to accalarata missile-site construction.^ Ihls was
followed closely by lncraasas in tha nunbar of plannad aisslla
sites. CoBsssnsurata with chase lncraasas tha demand far
construction workers multiplied at missHa-sites. The urgency
of gatting construction work performed was evident. As many
as 2,700 workers ware employed at individual missile sites
while construction work was being performed, la the overall
program, about 50 different Industrial and construction unions
4
represented these workers.
The process of construction at these bases reflected a
concurrent" approach in the development of missile weaponsM
2
U. 5. Congress, Supplemental Defense Appropriate Act
of 1958. Public Law 322, 35th Cong., 2nd Sess., 195a.
*U, S. Congress, Misery Constpruct^on Appropr^t^M.
Act of 1959. Fubllc Law »52, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 195*.
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systems. This approach was opposlta tha traditional step-by-
•tap development of previous weapons whereby each program phase
awaited the completion of previous phases. In the missile pro-
gram, phases have continued to overlap one another. Missile-
site construction began before tha research and development
phase of any particular missile type was completed. 5 The
significance of this fact Is that changes in design, construc-
tion delays, and delays in research and development often re-
sulted in missile installation and equipment checkout being
performed at tha same location and at the same time as construe*
tion work. This complicated die process. Various contractors
were necessarily performing their varied operations in e com-
plex array of construction work, equipment installation, and
other related tasks, all performed more or less simultaneously.
Contractors operated under two types of contracts, fixed-
price and cost reimbursement. Under the former, one fixed,
predetermined price was paid for a particular job. Under the
latter, or cost-reimbursement type, there was no certainty as
to the ensuing cost; research and development being incomplete
afforded no basis for cost determination. Thus under this type
contract, a contractor executed an agreement to perform a job
5 Ibid ., p. 9.
•Mute --fiti* *c\><i,%mr %sx «b 0*3*
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for * certain profit and was than allowed to charge all ex-
panses to the Government.
Whan the cost-reimbursement type contract is considered
in view of the tight schedules, necessity for work accomplish-
ment, end uniqueness or lack of previous similar experience
in such a costly, complex operation, it is evident that there
existed opportunities for abuse in work efficiency and con-
struction expense. Contractors in this situation could ignore
the requirement of supervising costs in order to profit from
their work*
As the missile-site construction program progressed, two
basic reasons developed for expecting greater labor problems
in this area than for other construction projects. Xhese reasons
are based on the situation as previously discussed. The first
reason advanced is that of "joint occupancy/ In this respect,
employees of contractors for construction work were performing
work at the site alongside the employees of weapons systems
contractors performing equipment installation and related ac-
tivity. Construction contractor employees were represented
6Ibid ., p. 10.













by industrial union*. This situation oftan lad to disputes
between building tradesmen and industrial unionists over the
matter of whether certain tasks ware construction or non-
construction in nature. Labor disputes of this type carry
the tarn "jurisdictional disputes.
"
The second basic reason for expecting a higher level of
labor disputes at these construction sites is manifested in
the numerous contracts and contractors. Union representation
means that collective bargaining agreements must be consum-
mated between Labor and Management. The more complicated a
project is in terms of numerous employers and unions, the
more chance there is for problems to arise regarding organi-
zational efforts and collective bargaining agreements.
There is other evidence that these were the primary
reasons for missile-site labor troubles. One respectable
magaslne report has stated that the main causes were juris-
dictional fights and the refusal of unionists to work with
o
nonunion man.
The Vice-President for Industrial Relations for the
Martin-Marietta Corporation* has described two reasons for
- -
i .1
. .. ii . i . i i» i i - ir - —innn 1
° 'Why Missile Workers Strike," Business Weak . Mo. 1728,
October 13, 1962, p. 117.
Douglas V. Dorman, cited in Labor Relatione &efarancc
Msnual (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs), Vol. 49,
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the labor trouble. One conforms to previous discussion, being
the unique situation of Che missile-site cons cruetion progreio.
The second reason advanced by this official Is the interpre-
tation of the Davis-Bacon Act. This Act
• . . establishes employment standards for laborers
and mechanics engaged in public construction under
federal contracts for amounts in excess of $2,000*
Such contracts, the Davis-Bacon Act requires must
specify the minimum wages to be paid the various
classes of mechanics and laborers employed on the
project. These minimum rates are to be those
determined by the Secretary of Labor to be prevail-
ing for such jobs in the particular locality.**'
This Act is considered only to guarantee a minimum wage
to laborers and mechanics who work on federally-financed
construction projects. However, the Act has been construed
by some building trades unions as "a grant of jurisdiction
over work performed at the missile oases . l
The McClellan Committee hearings focused further attention
on the Davis-Bacon Act. Testimony in these hearings revealed
that the historical result oi applying this Act to a construc-
tion project j.s that construction workers perform the work.***
In this meaner, the statute becomes Involved in jurisdictional
disputes oetween trade unions and industrial unions. This Act
»» » ' i n i I <m m ii im .iiiii linn i I m* I I in n i I I 11 I I »- —» »»! WW I tm M il
I Labor Relations Expediter (Washington: Bureau of
National Affairs, 1963, p. 252.
uUwUL Vol. *#, p. Sb.
^U. s>. benate, op. cit .. p. 13.
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was enacted in 1931, during a tine when unions were relatively
weak and employers dominated labor relations programs. The
Act appears to have been designed to protect workers from
harsh practices of employers. The minimum wage established
by the Act thus provided a measure of protection for the
worker. Application of the Act, however, has been a continuing
problem over the years.*"* On April 25, 1961, the Secretary
of Labor observed in a letter to the Secretary of the Air
Force his growing concern of the problems arising from efforts
to apply the Act at missile-sites. 1^ An example of the form
this problem may take is shown in the construction of a
missile silo excavation. The construction may take place 160
or 170 feet underground. The project Involves a shaft- type,
mlnin type, or subway type excavation. Engineers and others
have not determined whether this should be classified as
"heavy" construction, or "building" construction. The signifi-
cance of the difference in the two terms is that the building
rate of pay is often higher than the heavy wage rate. Thus,
in the event that Davis-Bacon application is made as evidenced
by the building rate, then the labor expenses of the construe*
tion project might increase substantially. 5
^Cited in U. S. Senate, on. clt .. p. 46.
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As the labor problems at the miss11«-sitae are traced
through the period 1957-1961, they appear to be evidenced
primarily by the previously mentioned jurisdictional, union*
nonunion, and wage-scale controversies. The labor troubles
occurred mainly at 19 operational missile sites and at 3 test
sites. Troubles were the worst at the test locations. These
3 test sites Include Patrick Air Force Base (Cape Canaveral),
Vandenberg Air Force Base, and Edwards Air Force Base. Prob-
lems at Cape Canaveral were by far the greatest.
Labor troubles took various forms. First, it may be
appropriate to discuss wages and hours of work—traditionally
disputable subjects. Problems arising from the administration
of overtime are indicative of abuse to the mlssle program and
to the U. S. taxpayer. In some cases, where construction
deadlines required one type of workers such mn electricians
to perform overtime work, other unions such m» carpenters
or plumbers demanded the right to overtime likewise. In other
cases, union employees working 12-hour shifts would begin
their shifts at 12 o'clock noon and at 12 o'clock midnight.
This gave the workers the opportunity to get four hours regular
time and eight hours overtime due to work arrangements which
stipulated a regular work day as beginning et 8 o'clock a.m.
and ending at 4(00 p.m. This of course resulted in high
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construction labor costs. Many of the overtime abuses vara
carried on until the McClellan Committee hearings publicised
then, Through the 1957*1961 period though, military adminis-
trators and others bearing responsibility for the missile pro-
gram attempted to decrease overtime expense. But all through
the problem was permeated the issue regarding intervention
into labor relations between employers and employees* Correc-
tive action finally cut down on the overtime abuse.^
High wage costs were a resultant of not only the previous-
ly detailed overtime situation but were also a result of high
wage scales and inefficiency. Officials of the U. S. General
Accounting Office made spotchecks of payrolls at Vandenberg
and Cape Canaveral for the period 1958 to I960. At Vandenberg,
one contractor was revealed to have employed 52 plumbers and
pipefitters, and 68 electricians. The plumbers and pipefitters,
were paid wages averaging $451 weekly, highest being $733 and
the lowest $402. Electricians averaged $510 weekly, highest
being $670 and lowest $413. These figures were for a 50-hour
weak, reflecting 5 ten-hour days. At Cape Canaveral, the
foreman of common laborers made $434 a week. Iron workers
17Ibid ., p. 50.








averaged $520 weekly. Some other figures were elevator opera-
tors: $360 a week; truck driver: $324 a week; and warehouse
clerk: $262 a week. All these costs were passed on to the
Government and to the taxpayer by virtue of cost-plus-fixed-
fee contracts.
Work slow-downs were another form of labor trouble. In
several Instances unions demanded that factory-assembled
equipment be torn down and reassembled at construction sites
because such assembly should be the job of the missile-site
union employees. Examples occurred whereby contractors allowed
the workers to figure the time it took to disassemble and
assemble and then sit Idly by for the required length of time.
The excuse for this from the contractors' standpoint was so
that the tolerances and configuration of the equipment would
not be changed by the construction site workers.
*
9
Work stoppages as manifested in strikes resulted in
much delay in construction work. These strikes resulted from
the various causes and reasons as previously discussed. How
significant were the strikes? How much time- loss resulted
from them?
16Ibld . . pp. 125-129.
l9Ibld . . pp. 100-101.
















Man-days of La>or Lost
Statistical measures of time lost due to work stoppages
ara aado In terms o£ the wan-days o£ lost labor occurring as
a result of work Interruptions. A nan-day is calculated on
the basis of an 3-hour work day. This font of measurement is
utilized by the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and has been
adopted by those authorities who have compiled missile-site
labor information. Missile-site labor statistics have appeared
in Congressional records and in reports of the Missile Sites
Labor Commission.
The published record of the McClellan Committee hearings
does not reflect any overall compilation. Figures presented
by various witnesses at the hearings are reflective of
occurrences within certain phases of the construction program.
Those hearings statistics considered most significant pertain
to two areas—work stoppages at Cape Canaveral, and a summary
of man-days lost at 1CBM missile sites.
The Cape Canaveral figures were compiled by the U. S. Army
Corps of Engineers who administer certain construction respon-
sibilities at the missile-sites. At Cape Canaveral, there
were 103 work stoppages with 86,503 man-days lost from July 1956
through December I960. This total includes construction,
industrial, and maintenance workers.20









ICBM base figure* ««ra compiled by the U. ft. Air Force.
These pertain to totals of man-days lost end strike* et 19
operaclonal missile-site* cod et 3 test sites. The tie*
period for tee statistics included tie* lapse from start
of construction through March 31, 1961. As revealed, there
21
were 327 work stoppages end 162, 872 nan-days lost*
She significance of the foregoing statistics is that
they provided, in 1961, a basis for an urgent, detailed re*
view of the problem and highlighted the need for lamed Is to
action to curb the delay being caused to the missile-site
construction program.
As overall compilation of man-days lost is available in
Missile Sites Labor Commission records. These reveal that
during the period July 1936 through May 1961, there were
17,761,000 man-days worked and 183-478 man-days lost in the
missile-site construction program due to work stoppages. *
Charts comparing these statistics to more recent ones will be
presented in Chapter V; these will illustrete in graphic
detail the trends from 1956 through June 1963. In order to
clarify the man-days worked versus man-days lost situation
2 lIbid .
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from July 1956 through May 1961. Tabic 1 has baan praparad
containing percentage and ratio analyses.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF MAM-DAYS WORKED
AMD MAN-DAYS LOST AT U.S.




Per Cent Lost to Worked 1.04
Ratio Worked to Lost 96 to 1
•Source: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
A*«ly»*>« 9* W«» s*>PP«fi«» on U. S.
Missile Sites June 1961-May 1962.
July 1962, p. 10.
The relationship of mao-da/s lost to man-days worked,
expressed ttn a percentage, is the most common measure of
the effect of work stoppages. '3 The overall loss rata of
all the missile-sites for the July 1956-May 1961 period was
1.04 per cent. This means that 96 man-days were worked for
each man-day lost.
Comparison of Missile Sites Labor Statistics
with All Industry and Contract Construction
A comparison of contract construction and all industry
work stoppage data with missile-site labor statistics reveals
23Ibld . . p. 4.
A I 1 1 p < > •<-* >„>© r « r
.
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some significant information, fable 2 provides this com-
parison.
Ad analysis of Table 2 shows that tha relationship between
man-days lost and man-days worked in contract construction and
all industry may be expressed mm a percentage and compared
with missile-site data* On the missile-sites, the overall
loaa rate was 1*04, meaning that 96 man-days were worked for
every man-day loot. For contract construction, the corresponding
percentage was .55, or 190 man-days worked for each man-day
loat. For all U. S. industry, the corresponding percentage
waa .26, meaning 333 man-days were worked for each one loat.
Xhe significance of these figures is that there waa more
labor time loat at the missile-sites relatively speaking, than
in either contract construction or in U. S. industry mm a
whole. Xhis points out the seriousness of labor problems
affecting tha missile program. If these missile-site labor
problems mxm considered in conjunction with the characteristics
of labor relations in the building trades, for instance, they
stand out aa significant.
It la a general characterlatic of the construction and
building industry that, despite sine, no coheslveness nor
Integration of firms, products, managerial functions, and
*>a aid* tofcirovoj £ i i ,ji£jta foi
ytiiftq
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON utf LOST lUft. AX MISSILE SITES
WITH CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION AND ALL
INDUSTRY JULY 1956-MAY 196
1
Missile All Contract All Industry
Sites* Construction In u. ST"
in U.S.*
Man-Days Worked 17,761,000
Man-Days Lost 165,47* 20,435,000 153,200,000
Per Cent Lost
to Worked 1.04 .55 .26
R tio Worked
to Lost 96 to 1 190 to 1 333 to 1
•source j U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis
9^ Work Stoppages on U f S T H^ssiie S^ea Jug*
1961-May 1962 . July 1962, p. 10.
Souree: U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor
Review; Vol. 60, 1957, pp. 566 and 569} Vol. 61,
1956, pp. 466-467; Vol. 82, 1959, pp. 637 and
640; Vol. 83, 1960, Statistical Supplement,
pp. 56 and 60; Vol. 84, 1961, pp. 615 and 617;
Vol. 85, 1962, pp. 662 and 666.
(NOTE: Figures for half-years 1956 and 1961
are interpolated.)









production technique has been widely adopted. 24 As concerning
missile-site construe ticn it seems that a greater opportunity
for achieving auch cohcaivemees and integration would exlat.
The xinaa participating in mlaatle-aite conscruetIon should
be integrated in e higher tcshioo than othera in the economy;
they would work in en environment of similar geographical,
topographical, admlnlstrative , legal, and purposeful consider-
ations. While the products are not exactly the seme, they ere
et least integrels of e coasaon whole. They become entities of
the sane physical structures and could be considered like
products in that they comprise e definite, distinguishable
physical resultant. While managerlei functions are not per*
formed by the same administrators, these sdminls tratora are
related by the environment in which they work. The techniques
of construction et miaaile-aitea could be related by virtue
of their employment within the missile-site construction atmos-
phere. All this means that there should be opportunity for
missile-site construction lebor reletions to be better organised
end better coordinated than in other construction situations.
Yet this is not the cese. Statistics show that there was less
24William Baber and Harold M. Levineon, Lebor Radons
and FroductlvltT in the BuHdine Trades (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Bureau of Industrial Halations, l?:m), p. 9.
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•cable labor relations during 1956*1961 at missile-sites than
in other contract construction.
The main reasons for these labor troubles have already
been discussed. Analysis has revealed the underlying current
of jurisdictional, contract negotiation, union-nonunion, and
other grievance disputes that have led to the statistical
record.
Summary
The problem of labor disputes at U. S. missile bases
reached acute proportions by the Spring of 1961. Labor troubles
resulted from the unique situation of the missile-site con-
struction program, the joint occupancy of construction areas
by Industrial and craft type unions, administrative difficulties
as manifested in wage-rate and overtime applications, and the
fact that the need for progress often necessitated that
Labor's demands be acquiesced to in the interests of maintaining
productive work schedules.
During the period July 1956-Msy 1961 there were 96 man-
days worked at missile-sites for each man-day lost due to work
stoppages. In all U. S. contract construction there were 190
man-days worked for each lost. In all U. S. industry the
ratio was 333 to 1. These statistics clearly show the need
that existed for improvement In missile-site labor relations.
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Some means were evidently necessary for attaining a better
record of labor stability. The requirement that improvement
be affected immediately was evident. Clearly the labor
troubles were affecting progress in missile-site construction.
The sites were designed to aid in maintaining national security.
It was imperative that their completion be achieved quickly
and efficiently.
The position of Labor during the 1950' s was improved
considerably and unions were able as never before to demand
shares of business profits. The demands of Labor had not yet
been proven as detrimental to national security. However,
increasing concern over labor disputes at mlssile-sltes began
to clarify labor abuses that evidently affected the Interests
of the nation. Here was a definite and recognizable need
for action to curtail Labor's activities.
What method seemed appropriate for negotiating labor
peace in this area of conflict between Labor and Management
that was evidently affecting national security? Previous
analysis has demonstrated that Federal Government participation
in labor-management relations was an historically acceptable
method. Could this be employed in the missile program?
What Issues surround Government intervention in this respect?






THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
AS A THIRD-PARTY TO LABOR DISPUTES
HUM*
Introduction
The previous chapter detailed e substantial record of
labor problems at U. S. missile bases. Through comparative
analysis with the effects of labor disputes in other areas of
the economy, it was demonstrated that missile-fits labor
troubles were of alarming proportion* Clearly, such a combina-
tion of results, if allowed to progress, would seriously impede
the effectiveness of the missile program as a means of enhanc-
ing national security.
As these problems became generally recognised as having
detrimental effect upon the nation's missile program, what
were the attitudes of Labor, Management, and the Federal
Government? This chapter will explore these through an analysis
of the overall issue surrounding Government Intervention ^9
a third-party to labor disputes*
Government and the Public Interest
The general acceptability of Government participation In
labor-management relations has already been established. It
has been shown that Government intervention is to be expected
when labor dispute problems have detrimental effect upon
national security. Therefore, when missile-site labor troubles
.aa&Ad aliaale ,8 .11 is feu*
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became a problem of national concern, soma fom of Government
action designed to curb the abuses was expected. The issue
surrounding Government intervention, then, becomes a matter
of establishing 'rational governmental policy" 1 rather than
the propriety of participation.
To provide additional perspective in considering the
separate views of Labor, Management, and Government regarding
Government intervention, it is appropriate to point out two
significant considerations. First of all, the matter must be
discussed with the public interest in mind. This is unavoidable,
<
for ^b Hanslowe states, 'meaningful discussion • • . cannot
avoid examination of the public interest in general
.
Secondly, participation or Intervention by the Federal
Government must be recognised as designed to supplement, not
to supplant, the bargaining relationship between employees and
their employer. Hildebrand has called this triiateralisa."3
The term fits well the situation whereby the parties are con-
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''This reasoning is developed in detail by William Gomberg
in "Government Participation in Union Regulation and Collective
Bargaining, M labor Law Journal . Vol. 13, November 1962, pp. 921-952
2K. In Hanslows, "Labor Law and the Public Interest,"
Journal of Public Law. Vol. 11, Spring 1962, p. 27.
3G. H. Hildebrand. "Use of Tripartite Bodies to Supplement
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It must be understood thee questions regarding govern*
mental policy 1a missile-site labor matters are wrapped up in
more comprehensive considerations relating to tripartite
labor relations in general, this larger question relates a
great deal to collective bargaining as a social institution
and to the entire scope of labor-management relations; decisions
emanating from these relationships affect the vary core of
the public versus private dilemma— the dilemma of matching pub-
lic and private interests within the framework of a democratic
society.
Furthermore, problems created by changing technology
cannot be separated from the analysis. The fact that Govern-
ment has become so involved in the processes of collective
bargaining reflects the many problems with which the institution
of collective bargaining has become concerned. To amplify this:
The Intensity of the race for improved technology
poses an increasingly serious challenge to collective
bargaining to resolve labor-management conflicts in
a cooperative and positive fashion. Collective bar-
gaining is on trial. The nature of technological
change carries with it the threat of great labor strife
as well as the opportunity for great advance in labor-
management cooperation. The survival of collective
bargaining as an expression of the intent of free men
to work out their problems In democratic fashion de-
pends upon the way collective bargaining meets with
this new challenge.
^
4John W. HcConnell, Dean of the Hew York State School
of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.

















When Labor and Management are considered «• the only parties
to collective bergaining practices, then the results of their
actions must conform to the public Interest in general, in
order to be acceptable to the society. If not acceptable,
then it is the responsibility of the Government to act in be-
half of the public interest. Any tendency toward more and more
governmental participation in labor relations reflects the in-
ability of Labor and Management to serve their own interests
simultaneously with societal ones.
However, the mere participation of Government in labor matters
does not ensure successful prosecution of national interests.
3
Again there is the difficulty of matching political, economic, and
moral considerations among Labor, Management, and the Federal Gov-
ernment whose position may possibly reflect bias, the difficulty
of achieving absolute impartiality is a basic factor to be
considered.
Where, then, does Government stand in relation to missile-
site labor disputes? The answer is that the Federal Government
stands alongside the field of labor controversy and watches the
development of labor troubles. As long as the troubles effect
only the interests of Labor and Management and have no
ill effect upon societal considerations, then no basis for
Excerpted from a panel discussion, Sixth Annual Convention Pro-
ceedings, national Association of State Labor Relations Agendo*
Cited In Labor Law Journal . Vol. 13, November 19*2, p. 939.
Weaknesses in the present system are examined by J. A.
Raffaele; "Needed; A Fourth Party in Industrial Relations,"
Labor Law Journal . Vol.13, March 1962, pp. 230-244.
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governmental intervention exists. But when labor disputes
wrapped up in the overall tripartite dilamms evidence detri-
mental tendencies, Chen seme action becomes necessary.
Alternatives
Obviously there must exist certain alternatives available
to Labor, Management, and Government as pertaining to these
labor problems. One way to consider Labor and Management
alternatives is to look st both m9 having an opportunity to
take two courses of action. One is to bargain collectively in
pursuit of resolutions, while continuing to meet missile-site
construction responsibilities, the other alternative would be
not to bargain about the issues. The results of the second
alternative in the case of Labor, for example, would be work
stoppages, work slow-downs, and the like. This is the course
followed, and the result was the harm being brought to national
security as the problem took on greater import.
On the other hand, Government, by virtue of the failure
of Labor and Management to contain the effects of labor
controversies, stands appropriately ready to intervene. What
alternatives are available in this case? Several alternatives
may be considered. These may be comprised of strike prohibition










arbitration, governmental seizure of coni cruetion operations,
vigorous enforcement of existing laws, economic persuasion,
or more efficient governmental administration. How veil would
any of these alternatives serve the beat Interests of the
American public?
The first alternative, strike prohibition, would not
conform with the ideals of democratic labor-management
relations. The use of the strike aa an economic force in
collective bargaining is a well established principle la
American labor relations. Federal legislation of this type
would be vigorously opposed by Labor and by many other areas
of society* Arguments against such would stress the loss of
freedom of choice for employees in dispensing labor services.
Strike prohibition would not. after all, alleviate the many
and varied troubles occurring in misslie-site construction.
Disputes would still occur, the prohibition of strikea would
merely serve to aggravate the attitudes of workers, and al-
though officially the construction work might continue in pro*
gross, no assurance could be provided for the preservation of
quality and beat speed commenaurate with such.
—
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*John 1. Abercrombie, "Labor Relations Under AEC and NASA
Programs, ; Labor Law Journal, Vol. IA. January 1963, p. 104.
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Compulsory arbitration at a second alternative would
•till not serve to assure progress In resolving missile-site
labor disputes. Labor and Management representatives would
not be organised in any common, objective fori of relationship
whereby overall goals and working plans could be formulated
>
A large measure of the problem reflects varied interests.
The disputes m» experienced were so numerous that little aid
would be afforded by the time-consuming processes of compulsory
arbitration.
What about government seisure of construction operations?
The railroads were operated by the Federal Government during
World War 1. Could Government perform similarly in the case
of the missile-site problem? Ho, this would not be a feasible
solution. The Federal Government would be acting out of con-
text with established principles of economic, industrial, and
societal working relationships. Free enterprise would not
progress in an atmosphere of Government domination such as
would result from governmental control of construction. Also,
it would not be practical from administrative and economical
standpoints for the Government to construct the sites in this
manner.
Could vigorous enforcement of existing laws alleviate the
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instance, as pertaining to national emergency disputes would
not serve the purposes esquired in ameliorating missile-site
labor troubles. The aachlnery of existing laws would be
Inadequate in reaching the personal, uumeu elements imbedded
in the construction labor problems.
Could economic persuasion by the Federal Government attain
the desired results? Mo, this alternative would not be
feasible either. No amount of economic leverage in contract
administration or other form of action could reach the core
of the troubled relations between the employees engaged in
missile-site construction and their employers.
Efficient governmental administration might improve
organisational relationships, work scheduling, cost analyses,
and the like to a measurable extent. However, these improve-
ments would not reach the source of labor controversies.
What is Government to do? there is an alternative not
yet suggested. This is one of participation in labor relations
activities through tripartite action similar to previous
experiences. Xhe establishment of some form of Commission or
Board comprised of Labor, Management, and public representatives
to administer to labor dispute troubles might be in order.
In this way, through Government sponsorship, the interests of












well as the general public interest, could be ascertained ab
having been considered in any particular course of ameliorative
action. This alternative was the one chosen . The form of
approach taken by the Federal Government is reflected in the
establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission by virtue
of an Executive Order Issued by the President of the United
States.
However, in order to clarify the position of Labor,
Management, and Government concerning the issue of tripartite
action in labor relations, it is appropriate to set forth
separate views representing each in the matter. A discussion
of these views in company with a review of national labor
policy and recent attempts toward achieving industrial peace
will aid substantially in understanding the atmosphere of
cooperation experienced in the activities of the Missile
Sites Labor Commission.
Rational Labor Policy
What is the basic governmental policy in labor relations?
An understanding of this provides a measure of perspective
end orientation to the issue of tripartitlsm in general.
Fundamentally, the policy of the Federal Government is "that
of assuring to every worker the right to join unions of his
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choosing and to cotter the collective bargaining process."?
Or course, the right of the individual worker to join a union
of choice is qualified by the application of majority desires
in any Individual group of workers voting on union representation.
But overall, the opportunity co bargain collectively with
employers has become firmly established as basic policy in
America*; labor relations.
As the effects of private actions by employees and
employers in the bargaining process have grown wider in scope
and associated with the general interests of the public, govern*
mental interest has grown in labor relations in order that
the oest Interests of society may be served.
President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-hanagement Policy
On February 16, 1961, President Kennedy issued Executive
Order No. 10913 establishing the President's Advisory Committee
on Labor-Management Policy. Committee members were appointed
representing the public at large, Labor, and Management, as
well as the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Commerce.
7Joseph P. Goldberg, "The Changing Role of Government
in Labor Relations," Annals of the American Academy of


















This committee reflects en attempt Co achieve greater
cooperation, understanding, and free, responsible action in
collective bargaining and labor-management relation* in
general. It it significant that this committee haa promulgated
tha unanimous view that collactiva bargaining muet ba rasponaiva
to tha public interact. Additionally, tha Committee ia unani-
mous in tha view that forma of third-party assistance in
collective bargaining and other labor relation activities
can be used to good advantage. Expert assistance by third
parties not only aids in factfinding, but helps in the analysis
of particular problems, including actions of private mediation
and the offering of recommendations on crucial issues*
Third-party assistance in recognised as supplementary procedure
only, however, and is not construed to be a primary method
of dispute adjudication. The central emphasis is placed "on
the development of bilateral relationships based on sufficient
maturity, sophistication, and judgment to enable the parties
to work out solutions appropriate to their particular circum-
stances. Responsibility flourishes best in an atmosphere of
self-reliance."*
g
President's Advisory Committee on Labor-Management
Policy, fret nn4 Responsible Cofrfrct}vc parfialnjnfl aa^ fr^us-
Peace; A Report to the President. May 1, 1962, pp. 1*2.
9Ibid ., p. 4.
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The recognition that Industry and labor must bear
graatar social responsibility In present-day labor relations,
and tha naad for Imaginative, improved, voluntary, and
reasonable actions of third-party assistance is considered
highly significant in relation to labor problems that have
been experienced at U.S. nissiie bases.
Vim w coyyiiffiqi'f &4«
Representative views from Labor and Management alike
strongly oppose the idea of compulsory arbitration in labor
disputes. An assortment of techniques might be advanced as
to the form that compulsory arbitration might take. A Labor
spokesman states that "a system of compulsory arbitration
would destroy collective bargaining." A further Labor
view is that more consideration to human values is required
than would result from governmental dictation of wages and
working conditions such as might result from a compulsory
arbitration.
11
Management representatives believe that the significant
choice to be made lies between alternate degrees and forms of
10Peter Henle, "A Union Viewpoint," Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science , Vol. 333, January 1961,
p. 14.
' Harry Van Arsdale, "the Role of Government in Collective
Bargaining Negotiations, H Labor Law Journal . Vol. 13, Nov-
ember 1962, p. 929.
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government regulation; however, in Che interests of en
efficiently operating free enterprise system, top-level tripar-
tite meetings of Labor, Management, and public representatives
must be utilised with caution. 13
The consensus appears to be that Government intervention
bespeaking definite provision for arriving at decisions in
labor dispute matters would be inappropriate. In es sense,
neither Labor nor Management is willing to go on record as
agreeing to the concept that they must reach final accord,
through bargaining, with the opposition party to labor disputes.
Each would reserve the opportunity to decide on acceptable
terms.
The incompatibility of required conformance to terms
posed by either negotieting party, or a third-party, with the
opportunity of choice in a competitive free enterprise economy,
is considered to constitute the main concern of Labor and
Management.
How do Government representatives stand in relation to
the overall issue? The consensus here is that the right of
Government is not a license for widespread intervention,^ ^ut
l2
william G. Capias, "A Management Viewpoint, M Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science .
Vol. 333, January 1961, p. 17.
13Conrad R. Cooper, "The National Interest in Collective
Bargaining, Labor Law Journal . Vol. 13, November 1962, p. 932.
14w. £. Simkln, "Third Seat at the Bargaining Table: A
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la instead based on the need for action In the public
interest, 15
The proper role of Government, mb conveyed by the pattern
of consensus among Labor, Management, and Government repre-
sentatives, la partly one of providing definite forms of
third-party assistance. Therefore, there is no denial that




In the free enterprise society that comprises rtserican
ideals of democratic opportunities, there is a need for Labor
and Management to have the opportunity of working out their
problems in mutual confidence. This opportunity is provided
in the processes of collective bargaining. Collective bargain*
ing Includes not only the negotiation of labor contracts, but
also provides for the review, consideration, and adjudication
of labor disputes es they occur. Leber end Management in the
free enterprise system are afforded the means by which they
may serve their Individual interests. The problem of aligning
these private Interests with public Interests results In
tripartite action in labor-management relations due to the
15James J» Reynolds, "The Role of Government in
Collective Bargaining negotiations; The Public Interest,"
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Federal Government's responsibility for serving Che beet
interest* of society.
Labor and Management agree that Government intervention
as a third-party to labor disputes Is necessary and helpful.
The application of method by which aid should be efforded,
however, Is controversial. Nevertheless consensus has been
garnered in some areas of labor conflict pertaining to
method in tripartite action. &uch consensus is illustrated
in the method of solution applied toward labor problems
at I). S. missile bases.
The establishment of a Missile Sites Labor Commission
Is a definite form of tripartite action. The requirement
that tripartite action be taken has been clearly demonstrated.
The form has been defined, but not analysed. This will be
accomplished In the following chapter, after which conclusions
will be set forth regarding the issue of Federal Government
intervention as a third-party to labor disputes, based
on the analysis of mlssile-slte labor experiences.
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CHAPTER V
THE MISSILE SITES LABOR COMHISSION
V M3T<
uHtm
The record of labor problems occurring at U. S. missile
esses has been discussed in relation to the issue of tripertitism
in general. Shis chapter will detail specific governmental
action designed and implemented to resolve the labor disputes
having detrimental effect on the nation's missile-site
construction program. This analysis will Illustrate the
effectiveness and the value of Government participation in
labor-management relations. Included in this analysis will
be the establishment, purpose , membership, adjustment machinery,
policies, rulings and decisions, and the record of ijmprovement
in missile-site labor relations attained since the Commission
was established.
As a result of hearings on missile-site labor disputes
before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations, the Secretary of
labor held a series of meetings in the Spring of 1961 with
representatives of Labor, Management, and the public, directed
toward finding a solution to labor problems at U. S. missile
bases.
h. S. tfissile Sites Labor Commission, United for America i
p. 2.
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Primarily as a result oi these meetings, 2 a "no-strike,
no- lockout" pledge was made by Labor and Management leaders
whose employees vara involved in a missile-site construction,
this pledge was a voluntary one. It reflected a geniune con-
cern on the part of union and company leaders regarding labor
disputes at the missile beses.
Despite the pledge, however, strikes continued in the
missile-site construction program. The Secretary of Labor set
up a three-man team to try to resolve the disputes. In
addition, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service "put
its men on a 24-hour alert to intervene instantly in any
labor disputes at the missile bases. "* These measures are
indicative of the developing concern of the Federal Government
for missile-site labor troubles, in analyzing this Increased
governmental concern, it is noted that definite action began
to be taken soon after the Kennedy Administration took office
in January 1961. Although congressional investigation of the
missile-site labor disputes was in progress prior to this, the
fact is that President Kennedy himself demanded more speed
3t,Featherbedding on the Pads," Time, Vol. 76, No. 19,
May 5, 1961, p. 79.
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in chc missile b«»« construction program soon after his inaug-
uration.4 This interest of the new Administration, combined
with die racord of missile-site labor problems detailed during
the McCleilan fnmmIttee hearings and the increased concern
of the American public over the issue , led to the Issuance
of Executive Order Ho. 10946 on tfay 26, 1961. The order ee-
tablishad a program for resolving labor disputes at missile
and space sites
The establishment of this Commission illustrates the
progression of governmental interest and participation in
labor-management relations. Previous note has been made of
the President's Advisory Committea on Labor-Management Policy
which was established on February 16, 1961. Although the es-
tablishment of the Hleelle Sites Labor Commission cannot be
said to have stemmed directly from the Advisory Committee, it
should be noted that governmental interest in labor matters
through the Advisory Committee's tripartita form of labor,
Management, end public representatives do evidence a certain
precedent. The Missile Sites labor Commission, established for
the specific purpose of developing policies, procedures, and
methods of adjustment for resolving missile-site labor disputes,
4
"Back of the Delay in U. S. Hieeile Bases, ' U. S. News
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was also composed of representatives from these three areas
acting under Government sponsorship.
The membership of the Missile Sites Labor Commission is
composed of: the Secretary of Labor, designated as Chairman;
the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
designated am Vice-chairman, three public representatives
drawn from Labor; and three from Management, as designated by
the President.
In this manner, workers and employers alike are afforded
the opportunity to attend to private interests, while repre-
sentatives of the general public bring into consideration the
Interests of anerlcan society as a whole. By virtue of the
membership of the Secretary of Labor and the Director of the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Federal Govern-
ment also fulfills its responsibility for acting In the over-
all Interest of the public which includes Labor and Management.
Adjustment Machinery
The Missile Sites Labor Commission has several procedures
at its disposal in dealing with missile-site labor disputes:
At each missile or space site, the Commission
will set up an on the spot committee consisting of
representatives of manufacturers, construction firms,
the International unions involved, the contracting
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Service. The job of those committees Is to antici-
pate and solve problems before they become acute.
Existing voluntary dispute-adjustment machinery
will be used, where effective....
Existing legal procedures also will continue to
be used and will be augmented, A section of Che
executive order asks the SLRB and its General Counsel
to sat up 'accelerated procedures for dealing with
matters at missile and space sites within the Board's
jurisdiction, in accordance with the law.'
Disputes not disposed of by these procedures
will be handled by special panels, composed of Com-
mission members or others.... The panels will hold
hearings and may make findings of fact, recommend
a settlement, get agreement for final and binding
arbitration, and take such other action as the Com-
mission may order.*
Because of its voluntary and persuasive adjustment methods,
the Missile Sites Labor Commission is unique, the tripartite
labor relations committees at local levels were established
for the specific purpose of solving labor problems before
they develop into serious disputes. These local committees
utilise the concepts of voluntarism and friendly persuasion
to the greatest possible extent. These concepts are not unique;
but the method by which they are employed are unique. In this
manner, the local committees act as sounding boards for innum-
erable gripes and grievances; thereby providing an opportunity
for discussion of these within an atmosphere of good will.
The availability of such opportunities to express views and














opinions regarding working relationships conforms to tradi-
tional principles of industrial human relations programs.
As previously noted, the Commission has special subdivi-
sions, or panels, which apply toward solution ox special
problems. These are comprised of special, individual committees
of three general types. First there is the Construction
Committee. Panels of this type are concerned with matters
related to missile*site construction work. Secondly, there
is the Industrial Committee. Industrial panels handle problems
with manufacturers of missiles and industrial unions. The
third type of Committee has public members dealing with matters
not clearly within the jurisdiction of Construction and
Industrial committees. When labor problems are not resolved
by the local committee, referral is made to the Construction,
Industrial, and Public committees, thence to the Commission
as necessary. At the Commission level, voluntary methods are
attempted again prior to the utilization of directives or or*
ders for dispute settlement. The Commission, in turn, cooper*
ates with other Federal agencies in making its work effective.
These include "the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,
the national Labor Relations Board, the Department of labor,
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Administration, and the National Joint Board for the Settle*
ment of Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction Industry."6
poises
TWo principal policies have been developed by the
Missile Sites Labor Commission, The Commission has promulgated
these as recommended principles by which negotiators should
be guided. These policies pertain to two main areas: Indus*
trial Policy and Construction Policy. They apply specifically
as "guides in implementing the economical operations provision
of the Executive order.'
The Commission's industrial labor policy recommends to
parties to labor disputes that agreements applicable to
Industrial activity at U. S. missile bases follow these guides:
Wage rates, fringe benefits, and other conditions
of employment should not be negotiated which are in*
consistent with standards generally applicable in
similar situations ... or unreasonable under all
the circumstances*
In establishing wages, benefits, and working
conditions at the sites, recognition should be given
to national standards and policies established to
cover Industrial activity phases at missile sites*
. • i The orderly manning of sites by skilled
and trained workmen is a significant factor affecting
economical and efficient operations . . . This may
require transfer of industrial workers from the home
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmtmmmtmmmm^mmmmmtmmmmmmmmmmKmmmmmKmmmMmmmmm^tmmmi^ammmm i mmi—Wi mm i M ilium——
»
^U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, loc* cit .
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manufacCuring plants Co a missile aica or from
one missile sica Co another. Procedures and
conditions, not inconsistent with standards
generally applicable, or not unreasonable under
all Che circumstances, will be regarded. . .
m9 reasonable.**
the Commission has sec torch Che following guides:
Wage races, fringe benefits, and other con*
diClone of employment should not be negotiated
which establish more costly standards on missile
and space site construction chan are made appli-
cable Co other construction activity in similar
circumstances.
The introduction of new conditions in an
area wlch sices for any crafc should be judged
against Che standards of practice In Che region
and construction Induscry generally. Ic is
recognised that some areas may require somewhat
higher wages, benefits, and conditions Chan have
prevailed In Che past Co attract sufficient man*
power into an area Co perform Che missile and
space sice work.'
The Missile Sices Labor Commission has also promulgaced
carCain recommendations pertaining to Che manning of missile*
sice construction projects chat bear policy considersclans.
These are aa follows:
The Commission urges that the international
unions continue to give every possible assistance
Co requests by contractors co man construction
sices parcicularly in isolaced localities.
The Commission urges Che Defense Department
and NASA Co review Che present schedules of over*
time hours on bases. The differences in scheduled
overtime on sices in the same region, at times
In Che jurisdiction of Che same local union or labor
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supply area, it a factor making difficult tha
recruitment of manpower and contributes to high
turnover. While uniformity la understandably
difficult, sitae in the same region should nor*
ally be worked the same schedules. 3"
What is the significance of the foregoing policy state-
ments? the significance seems to be that these policies con-
stitute procedures , or bases upon which individual labor disputes
could be analysed and adjudicated. These policies, procedures,
or foundation for decision-making, whatever they mr^ considered
to constitute, do provide definite guidelines for the local
labor relations committees at the missile-site construction
projects. Furthermore, and perhaps most important, they serve
as preventive measures. These policies submit to union and
company leadership a clear-cut guide for designing employee
work plans. Thus, when Labor and Management have prior knowledge
of wage levels, fringe benefits, working conditions, and the
basic guides by which each of these is to be determined, then
this contributes substantially to chances for labor peace and




Three significant rulings or decisions of the Missile
Sites Labor Commission occurred soon after the Commission's
establishment. The first decision of July 21, 1961, Involved
l0Ibid.
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Operating Engineers versus International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW). This esse concerned a jurisdic-
tional dispute over the installation of underground cable at
Walker Air Force Base, Roswell, Mew Mexico. The Commission
ruled:
Disputed work operations Involved in installa-
tion of underground cable at missile base are
inter-related and should be performed on composite
basis, though not necessarily with equal division
of men, by members of . . . Operating Engineers and
. • . Electrical Workers, in accordance with
Commission determination as to which jobs are with-
in jurisdiction of each union. 1
The second and third rulings, August 23, 1961, concerned
collective bargaining agreements regarding hazard pay and
wage rates. The former was in reference to the National
Electrical Contractors Association versus IBEW at Vandenberg
Air Force Base. The latter concerned wage rates in reference
to Associated General Contractors versus International Hod
Carriers at Forbes Air Force Base.
Hazard pay ruling—
Contract provision granting electrical workers
at missile site premium pay for time spent working
at heights under hazardous conditions is reasonable
in that it involves no pyramiding of premium pay,
and is limited in hours and men to actual exposure
to hazard, and is not applicable once hazardous con-
ditions are eliminated.**
11Labor Arbitration Reports (Washington: Bureau of
National Affairs, 1962), Vol. 36, p. 1285.
12Ibid . Vol. 37, p. 1.
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Waif ntt ruling-*
Area collective bargaining contract's provision
catting higher wage rates in one of four counties
covered by contract, but requiring higher rate in all
counties for 'all building work contracted by an agency
of the Federal Government' , is discriminatory to Mis-
sile site construction, there being no current problem
in manning base in question. *3
The significance of the three rulings is determined
to be mt follows: (1) July 21, 1961—This ruling occurred
just two months after the Missile Sites Labor Commission
was established. The Commission acted quickly in determining
the problem and developing means for resolving the dispute.
The dispute was held to Involve operations that were vital
to the missile program. Voluntary procedures between dis-
putants had not solved the problem. The solution recommended
by the Commission was adopted. The case served to Instill
confidence In the ability of the Missile Sites Labor Commis-
sion to fulfill its mission. (2) August 23, 1961— the two
cases ruled upon this date had two results. First, the
hazard pay ruling and its "reasonableness" feature served to
underwrite further the fairness and the comprehensive analysis
that the Commission was willing to undertake. Secondly, the
wage rate ruling and its "discriminatory" feature made it
clear to Labor, Management, Government, and the public that
UIbid .
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th« Commission was not hesitant to act firmly and decisively
against practices detrimental to the missile program. In
this manner, respect was accorded the Missile Sites Labor
Commission.
The Record of Labor Disputes since
Establishment of the Commission
The Missile Sites Labor Commission has provided two
authoritative reports on labor disputes at U. S. missile bases
for the period June 1961 through May 1962. The first of
these constitutes the first annual report of the Commission's
activities. 14 The second report goes into greater detail in
an analysis of work stoppages occurring in the missile-site
construction program during the first year of the Commission. 15
The data for the second report was compiled by the Missile
Sites Labor Commission from field reports of the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service and the U. S. Air Force,
in addition to the files of the Commission.
In the letter of transmittal forwarding the first annual
report to the President, the Secretary of Labor made particular
note of the cooperation of Labor, Management, and Government
140. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, United for America :
A Report to the President . May 26, 1962.
15U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission, Analysis of
Work Stoppages on U. S. Missile Sites June 1961-Mav 1962 .
July 1962.
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at all levels of missile-site construction activity. It was
reported that th* Commission was highly successful la decreas-
ing tha nan-days of labor lost dua to labor dlsputas and in
achieving raductlons of coata at tha missile oases. During
tha Commission's first year, ae detailed by tha Secretary of
Labor, tha lost tine experienced wae reduced to an "all tine
low of 1 nan-day loat for each 1,100 man-days worked/'16
This 1100 to 1 ratio of nan-days worked to nan-days lost
during tha first year of tha Missile Sites Labor Coasjlsslon,
Nay 1961 to June 1962, nay be compared to the 96 to 1 ratio
of the four previous yeara, July 1956 to June 1961* This sig-
nifies a substantial improvement.
Table 3 shows the record of work stoppages by nontha
on missile bases during the twelve month period between
June 1961 and May 1962. There were 160 work stoppages during
this period* The mean number per month was 13.3. An inspaction
of Table 3 reveals that during the two nontha November 1961
and May 1962, work stoppages ware below the mean by a substantial
margin; chase were 8 and 5, respectively. During September
1961, January 1962, and February 1962, work stoppages ware
above tha mean; namely, Id, 23, and 19. The beat record waa
16tatter from Arthur J. Goldberg, Secretary of Labor and
Chairman of tha Missile Sites Labor Commission, to tha
President of the United States, May 26, 1962.
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TABLE 3
WORK STOPPAGES BY MONTHS ON MISSILE SITES
















•Source: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S .
Missile Sites June 1961-Mav 1962 .
July 1962, p. 13.
achieved during the month of May 1962 when only 5 work
stoppages occurred*
Table 4 provides information concerning the duration of
work stoppages at missile bases during the period June 1961
to May 1962. It is noted that most of the stoppages were of
short duration. Of the 160 stoppages, 119 (74.3 per cent)
lasted less than one and one-half days; also, it should be
.-..I- Tin . rjuir shut.
MnA
• W&.*'
"- 2W.» ..v..;. y»t- 10 &MMI Mil • "A : ->
•d hlwodi 3i ,<>•!» ^-•ao Jta* sno ami* •«•! JMtft*i
HTABLE 4
WORK DAYS LOST DURING WORK STOPPAGES
AT MISSILE SITES
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962*
Work Days Lost Number Per Cent
.00 - .49 29 18.1
.30 • .99 44 27.5
1.0 - 1.49 46 23.7
1.5 - 1.99 4 2.5
2.0 - 2.49 9 5.6
2.5 - 2.99 8 5.0
3.0 - 3.49 9 5.6
3.5 - 3.99 2 1.3
4.0 « 4,49 2 1.3
4.5 - 4.99
5.0 + Over 7 4.4
Total 160 100.0
Msan « 1.41
'Source: U. S. Missile Sites Labor Commission,
Analysis of Work Stoppages on U. S .
Missile Bases June 1961-May 1962,
July 1962, p. 15.
noted that 73 (45.6 per cent) were less than one day duration.
The Missile Sites Labor Commission has classified missile-
site labor disputes under five headings: (1) Grievance;
(2) Jurisdictional (Craft vs. Craft); (3) Jurisdictional
(Industrial vs. Craft); (4) union vs Non-Union; and (5) Con-
tract Negotiations. Table 5 shows the types of disputes that
occurred June 1961 through May 1962. Grievances constituted
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wmm
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TABLE 5
INCIDENCE OF WORK STOPPAGES AND MAN-DAYS LOST
AT MISSILE SITES ACCORDING TO TYPE OF DISPUTE
JUNE 1961 - MAY 1962a
Type of Dispute
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Totals 160 100.0 15,505 100.0
•Source: U. S. Missile Sites
Wo3Fk Stoppages on jtf.
Labor Commission. Analysis of
S. Missile Bases
May }.*62. July 1962. P- 20.
the most numerous type of disputes, being the primary issue
in 78 (48.8 per cent) of the 160 work stoppages. Grievances
account for 32.8 per cent of the total man-nays lost.
The combined types of jurisdictional disputes were pri-
mary Issues in 37.5 per cent of the 160 work stoppages, and
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Union vs. non-union disputes resulted mainly from offorts
of unions at missile oases to organize non-union workers.
This type dispute caused 11.2 per cent of the work stoppages
and 17.2 per cent of the total nan-days lost.
Contract negotiations constitute only a snail per cent
of work stoppages and nan-days lost; namely 2.5 per cent and
1.1 per cent, respectively.
Factual background on the types of grievances that occur-
red provides a better basis for understanding the abuses that
have previously been charged as occurring in the missile-site
construction program. Table 6 shows the incidence of work
stoppages and nan-days lost during June 1961-May 1962 by the
type of grievance. These figures denote improvement over the
previous four year period. It is unfortunate that figures have
not been available for this study in order to make a comparison
of grievances before and after the establishment of the
Missile Sites Commission. However, Table 6 shows that economic
demands were involved in 42.4 per cent of the grievances.
This Includes demands for overtime, wage rate, travel pay or
other pay disputes, and demands for reduced workweeks. These
type grievances were responsible for 51.2 per cent of the nan-
days lost due to grievances.
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INCIDENCE OF WORK STOPPAGES AND MAN-DAYS LOST
AT MISSILE SITES BY TYPE OF GRIEVANCE
JUNE 1961 - HAY 1962*
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Demand for Overtime 13 16.7 493 9.7
Wage Race, Travel Pay
or Other Pay Dispute
14 18.0 1,9*7 39.1
Reduction in Workweek 6 7.7 123 2.4
Discharge of Fellow Employee, 17 21. S 1,314 25.9
Shop Steward or Supervisor
Poor Ventilation, Inadequate
Beat and/or Food, Lack of
icewater, or other Working
Conditions
Lack of Craft Foreman, Union
Steward or Craft Worker
on a Job
Demand for Better Safety
Protest of Lay-Off
Resistance to Transfer
Refusal to Work for and Take
Orders from a Supervisor
or "Too Much Supervision' 1
Diagreement wjj&£n a Craft
over Work Assignments
Protest not being Allowed to







4 5.1 277 5.4
3 3.8 40 • 8
2 2.6 8 .1
3 3.8 21 .4
1 1.3 24 .5
1 1.3 40 .8
100.0 5,081 100.0
U. S, .Missile m Hon. *gf|Tf§f °
Worjc Stoppages on U. S. Missive Bases'
jlftXj^; July 1962, p. 21.
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A limited amount of data reflecting current raissile-
•ite labor dispute statistics has been aade available directly
to the author of this study by the Missile Sites Labor Commis-
sion. 17 This data is set forth in Chart Mo. 2 and Chart Mo. 3.
Chart Mo. 2 is a graph of the ratio of man-days lost to
man-days worked at missile based from July 1956 to June 1963.
The most striking feature of this graph is the abrupt decline
in the man-days lost to man-days worked ratio immediately
following the establishment of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.
The explanation of this graph is as follows: during the period
July 1956 through May I960, the ratio of man-days lost due
to labor disputes, expressed as a percentage of the total
man-days worked, totaled 1.78 per cent. From June 1960 through
May 1961, man-days lost totaled .593 per cent of man-days
worked. From June 1961, just after the Missile Sites Labor
Commission was established, through May 1962, man-days lost
were .091 per cent of man-days worked. The decreasing trend
in these percentages continued during the second year of the
Commission, June 1962 through May 1962, when the ratio of
man-days lost expressed a percentage of the man-days worked
totaled .077 per cent.
Chart Ho. 3 provides an analysis of missile-site labor
statistics through May 1963, in comparison with data compiled
Data provided by Mr. Richard P. Chambers, Labor Relations
Analyst, Missile Sites Labor Commission, as a result of a tele-
phone interview with the author on July 11, 1963.
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by Che Missile Sices Labor Commission from Bureau of Labor
Scatis tics sources on contract construction and all U. S.
Indus cry during 1962. There is a considerable difference in
Che man-days lose and man-days worked situation between Che
time prior Co Che establishment of Che Missile Sices Labor
Commission, and afcerwards.
Summary
This chapter has focused atcencion on Che organisation
and activities of the Missile Sices Labor Commission, and chrough
a presentation of statistical data, has clarified Che subs can*
cial improvement in labor relations at U. S. missile bases
since May 1961.
The Missile Sices Labor Commission was established by
Che President of Che United States Chrough Che issuance of
Executive Order Mo. 10946 on May 26, 1961. During Che four
year period prior Co that dace, work scoppages, work slowdowns,
and other problems due Co labor dlspuces in che misslie*sice
conscruccion program had evidenced a potential for seriously
affecting Che security of Che United Scates. The matter became
of sufficient concern by che Fall of 1960 Co warrant congression-
al investigation. Throughout che WinCer of 1960-1961, in-
vestigations of missile-sice labor problems were in progress
by che Senate Permanent Subcommlteee on investigations
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of the committee on Government Operations (descendant of the
Old Labor Rackets Committee), during this time, a now
Administration wee being formed.
Shortly after President Kennedy took office In January,
1961, ha laauad Executive Ordar Mo. 1091a which established
the Fraaldant* a Advisory Committee on Labor management Policy.
This Committee la tripartita In form; Ita membership la composed
of Labor, Management, and public representatives uadar tha
auapicaa o£ tha Federal Government— the Sacratary of Labor and
tha Secretary of Commerce aach alternately serve as Chairman
of tha Committee, Xhe function of tha Advisory Committee on
Ubor*ftana&ement Policy is to study, advise, and recoaaead
to tha President certain policies that nay be followed by
Labor, Msnagamont. and Government in ordar that indua trial
peace and tha Institution of collective bargaining nay be
preserved, tha establishment of this Committee evidenced a
concern of the Federal Government over the responsibilities
and actions ox unions and employera, and the tar*reaching
socletel effects that Lebor-managament decisions have in tha
American industrial economy* It is clear that theae effects
may include potentially serious harm to national security*
This occurs whan Labor and Management fall to reach accord in
missile-sita labor dispute matters. A single dispute, in itself,
inm » ,«.> luKnO »3flri'.'•*. i&cfiU bJCG
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nay not constitute potential harm to national security; however,
the combination of many disputes may. Such combination did
occur in missile-site construction activity. The Federal Govern-
ment then considered its responsibility for protecting and
preserving the general public interest, and as a result, the
Missile Sites Labor Commission was created for the purpose of
combating the menace of labor problems to national security.
It is a fact that a great deal of improvement in labor
troubles at the missile bases has been achieved through the
organization, adjustment methods, policies, and actions of
the Missile Sites Labor Commission.
It is highly significant that this Commission has
achieved such a laudatory record of improved labor relations
at U. S. missile bases. When these accomplishments are consid-
ered in view of the issue surrounding Federal Government inter-
vention as a third-party to labor disputes, it becomes enig-
matic that the exploration for possible forms and further
design of solutions to labor problems in other areas of the
U. S. industrial economy should not result in adaptation of
certain inherent features of the Missile Sites Labor Commission.
In the conclusion that follows, the usefulness of tripartite
action as exemplified by labor relations experiences in the




U. S. missHe-ait* construction progran will be aade applicable








This study has examined the problem of labor disputes
at U. S. missile bases in reference to the issue of Federal
Government Intervention m» a third-party to labor disputes.
Specific attention has been directed to the record of labor
problems effecting national security during World War I and
World War II. these wartime labor experiences demonstrate
the need for direct governmental participation in labor-
management relations when national security is threatened.
This particular role of Government is generally acceptable
to the American public and is also generally acceptable to
Labor and Management. In wartime, the fact that national
security depends upon the contribution of labor services
to Industrial production, providing materials and services
for war, Is readily understood by the public and by individuals
from the Labor and Management kcbab of society. The Federal
Government is expected to take definite action in settling
wartime labor disputes in order to meet the clear responsi-
bility that it bears for protecting the safety of the United
States.
However , In times of peace, the role of Government in
labor relations is less definite than during wartime. A lack
of clear and Imminent danger, or a general feeling of such on
the pert of the public, results in a lesser degree of partici-
pation by Government being acceptable to Labor and Management.
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Representatives of Labor and Management would strata, in
peacetime, the rights of each as Individual members of a free
enterprise society, in arriving at decisions bearing economic
import on Che basis of their own self-interests. Thus, labor
troubles occur when Labor and Management disagree on Issues
regarding their various forms of working relationships. In
the Industrial economy that identifies the material basis of
societal relationships in the U.S. today, the respective actions
of Labor and Management must reflect consideration for public
interests as well ms individual ones. This is so because of
the effect that their decisions may have throughout the
economy. For example, decisions of Management in recent years
to acheive more efficient and profitable industrial production
by automated processes have had to be judged In reference to
the beneficial as compared to the harmful effects upon society.
In some instances, automation has resulted in unemployment in
the labor force; however, the benefits gained through improved
technology, and the promise of technology in contributing to
future public interests, outweigh the immediate effects of
unemployment due to automation. This illustrates how Management
decisions affect inter-related areas of society.


























The same is true for Labor decisions. It is an as tab*
llshed concept of American democracy that Labor is entitled
to rights and privileges in organizing unions and pursuing
courses of action designed to benefit the interests of union
members. However, these union practices cannot be unbridled.
The public interest must take precedent at the determinable
factor in these labor relations activities. Therefore, strikes
and work stoppages which clearly show potentially serious
effect on the security of the nation cannot be permitted to
continue. For these reasons, the Congress has provided laws
through which the Federal Government may intervene in the
event that emergency disputes affect the health and safety of
the nation. In the system of checks and balances that denotes
the philosophy of American democracy, the Government must be
responsible for preserving the interests of Labor and Manage-
ment, but to a higher degree it is responsible for the public
interests. This is especially important when national security
depends upon the cooperative efforts of Labor and Management.
The cooperative efforts of Labor and Management are es-
pecially important in the U. S. missile base construction pro-
gram. Missile base construction is necessary in order that
operational utilization of ballistic missiles may be attained.
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When this capability is achieved, Aaerican society benefits
from the protection afforded by the missiles as strategic
and tactical weapons of war. Without these weapons, national
security would be impaired. Without the cooperation of Labor
and Management in missile-site construction, missiles cannot
be utilized. This signifies the responsibility that Labor
and Management bear together in attending to the general public
welfare in their misslie*site labor relations.
The issue regarding Federal Government Intervention as a
third-party to labor disputes is largely one of disagreement
among parties to disputes us to the form that Government par-
ticipation should take, and the degree to which governmental
action should be applied.
The record of labor disputes at U. S. missile bases, when
viewed with respect to the governmental actions by which the
effects of these disputes have been dissipated, illustrates
the vital necessity of extensive tripertlte action.
The Missile Sites Labor Commission is an example of how
the dilemma of public versus private interests in labor contro-
versies can be satisfactorily ameliorated through tripartite
adjudication. This Commission is relatively new, having served
in the public interest for only twenty seven months at the
time of this writing. It is concluded, on the basis of the
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analysis contained in this study, that this typa of tripartita
action evidences th« form and degree of Government intervention
that should be applied in other areas of industrial relations
when labor disputes threaten the national security.
9'J.A bmilL .V-£*.lSfc
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